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1 Introduction
Set-asides are used extensively in government procurements and resource sales like spectrum
auctions. They consist either in excluding from the auction some specic bidders (e.g. large
rms or previous auction winners)1,2 or equivalently in limiting the access to some well-chosen
bidders (e.g. domestic rms, small rms or new entrants). Specically, set-asides are routinely
used to favor small businesses in countries like the US, Canada or Japan. In Japan, for example,
approximately two thirds of civil engineering contracts are subject to set-asides (Nakabayashi,
2013). In the US, those federal procurement contracts billing between $3,000 and $150,000 are
automatically reserved to small and medium entreprises (SMEs) (Kang and Miller, 2016) while for
larger contracts, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) leave some discretion to contracting
ocers to exclude one or more sources, in particular under the motives that it would increase
or maintain competition and likely result in reduced overall costs for the acquisition, or for any
anticipated acquisition.3 Promoting small businesses is also an important goal in the EU, but the
European economic law is attached to principles of transparency, non-discrimination and equal
treatment that prohibit explicit discriminatory practices.4 Even when explicit discrimination
is not possible, implicit set-asides can still be at work for example through the requirement of
technological constraints that would be known to forbid the access of some potential participants
or by excluding a bidder on the ground that he previously caused some disappointment in the
past (see Saussier and Tirole (2015) who discuss some new European directives in this vein).
An important practical question is whether, when and to what extent set-asides policies reduce
the costs in public procurements.5 The research question addressed in this paper is whether
excluding some bidders could reduce the procurement cost, or equivalently boost the seller's
revenue in auction contexts. When addressing this question, we have in mind a positive perspective
by which we mean that we take the auction format as given and we investigate the eect of set-
asides. This is in contrast with the normative perspective seeking for the optimal auction format
1When contracts are renewed periodically, we could consider whether it could be benecial to exclude the
incumbent. E.g. in the Veolia Transport and Transdev case, the French antitrust authorities impose as a remedy
that Transdev Group, the merged entity, commits not to bid in a bunch of cities in the south-east of France for
which it was the incumbent (see paragraphs 446-450 in Décision no10-DCC-198 du 30 décembre 2010 and also
paragraph 43 in Décision no13-DCC-137 du 1er octobre 2013 that conrms that Transdev Group has met his
engagements). We thank Thibaud Vergé for bringing this antitrust case to our attention.
2In the auctions that determine the subsidy for the production of renewable energy in Portugal, a winning
bidder is automatically excluded from participating in the subsequent auctions (del Rio (2016)).
3See FAR 6.2 (Full and Open Competition After Exclusion of Sources):
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html/Subpart%206_2.html. Kang and Miller (2016) report that among
the contracts that are auctioned, one third is subject to exclusion.
4The winner should be the most advantageous tender while exclusion grounds are very limited (DIRECTIVE
2014/24/EU, Article 57).
5There is a limited empirical literature on pro-small business set-asides (Denes (1997), Nakabayashi (2013) and
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013)) which nds evidence that the induced increasing participation from small businesses
more than compensates the loss from those who have been set aside. On the other hand, this literature found
mixed evidence concerning the procurement costs/auction revenues. Beyond the competition motive, Kang and
Miller (2016) provide evidence that set-asides can save on the administrative costs attached to the processing of
bids. Coviello et al. (2016) argue that the possibility to exclude bidders with bad reputation allows to reduce moral
hazard issues. They nd evidence that set-asides can increase the probability that the same rm wins repeatedly
the contract as well as enhance a variety of ex post performance measure of quality (such as reductions in delays).
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as formalized by Myerson (1981) in contexts with exogenous participation or more recently by
Jehiel and Lamy (2015) in contexts with endogenous entry. The main objective of this paper
is to contribute to the policy debate on set-asides, assuming other discriminatory tools are not
available.
In the context of single-good second-price auctions with private values, when the set of par-
ticipants is exogenous, excluding some bidders reduces competition, and thus set-asides can only
be detrimental to the seller (excluding some bidders can only reduce the second-highest valuation
among the bidders and thus the nal price).6 By contrast, when participation is endogenous, it
would seem set-asides may possibly boost the participation of potential entrants in such a way
that it is benecial to the seller. In this spirit, Cramton (2013) argues that set-asides were at
the core of the success of Canada's spectrum auctions for Advanced Wireless Services (AWS)
because they encouraged participation from deep-pocketed new entrants, thereby resulting in a
push of the prices both for the blocks with set-asides and the blocks without. Relatedly, in the
UK 2000's spectrum auctions, the fact that one licence was reserved to a new entrant is considered
to be an important source of its success.7 The logic behind those cases is that set-asides can be
pro-competitive insofar as not allowing some bidder(s) to participate can boost the participation
of other kinds of bidders and possibly be overall benecial.
We start our analysis with the second-price auction in which the reserve price is set at the
seller's valuation - a format that we refer to as the Vickrey auction. We develop an endogenous
entry model in which bidders are either incumbents who participate for sure in the auction or
potential entrants whose participation rate is endogenously determined to ensure that the expected
payo entrants derive from participating matches their outside options. In some parts, we solve for
the optimal set-aside policy determining whom from the incumbents or which groups of entrants
should be banned. In other parts, we restrict the question to studying the benet of excluding a
specic incumbent or a specic group of potential entrants.
Our rst general insight is that irrespective of the shape of the distributions of valuations
6When bidders' valuations are i.i.d., Bulow and Klemperer (1996) provide a bound on how excluding one bidder
is detrimental to the seller in an ecient auction: They show that switching to the optimal mechanism (namely the
second-price auction with optimally set reserve price) would not compensate the seller from losing a single bidder.
For the rst-price auction with independently distributed valuations, Arozamena and Cantillon (2004) show that
when the valuation distribution of a bidder is upgraded then his competitors bid collectively more aggressively in
equilibrium. As a corollary, it implies that the seller's revenue decreases when some bidders are excluded. Under
aliated private values, Pinkse and Tan (2005) show on the contrary that a bidder may not bid more aggressively
when the number of its competitors increases. However, they do not address the incidence of increased competition
on the seller's revenue. Menicucci (2009) builds an example with symmetric bidders where the seller's revenue is
the largest when competition is limited to two bidders.
7In addition to the four incumbents, eleven new entrants participated in the UK auction, which strongly contrasts
with the failures in terms of both entry and revenue in the auctions for the 3G Telecom licences organized by some
other European countries (see Binmore and Klemperer (2002) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2003)), such as the
Netherland where only one entrant showed up resulting in a revenue per capita that was four times smaller than in
UK. Maybe the most drastic example of a harmful impact of an incumbent on competition is when a single bidder
deters all potential entrants from participating as illustrated in the 1994 US spectrum auctions where a license
covering all of southern California was oered and where it was publicly known that Pacic Bell, the incumbent
company, had a higher valuations than its rivals and thus should win for sure in an ascending auction (see Milgrom
(2004) for details and Klemperer (2002) for other entry deterrence examples, in particular with rst price auctions).
3
and the magnitude of entry costs, when there is only one incumbent, it is always benecial for
revenues to exclude the incumbent in the Vickrey auction.8 Exluding the incumbent is clearly
seen to be desirable when the incumbent is so strong that his presence would discourage any other
participation, thereby resulting in a rather poor revenue. But, our insight turns out to hold no
matter how strong the incumbent is. The logic for this can be understood as follows. From Jehiel
and Lamy (2015), we know that when the incumbent is out, the seller's revenue corresponds (in
expectation) to the welfare net of the entry costs of the entrants -referred to as the total welfare-
and that the best possible revenue is the one obtained through the Vickrey auction. When the
incumbent is in, revenues are reduced for the following reason. Making use of a fundamental
property of the Vickrey auction, the incumbent gets a rent equal to his marginal contribution
to the welfare. Hence, by a simple accounting argument, the seller's revenue corresponds (in
expectation) to the total welfare as if the incumbent were absent. Because participation rates
are optimally determined when the incumbent is out (as shown in Jehiel and Lamy, 2015), but
typically not so when the incumbent participates, we conclude that excluding the incumbent
is always good for revenues. Thus, when there is only one incumbent, the indirect benet of
excluding the incumbent obtained through a boost of entrants' participation always dominates
the direct cost of not having the incumbent for a xed set of participants.
Interestingly, the insight about the desirability of excluding the incumbent carries over to other
auction formats, as long as the incumbent gets a payo no smaller than his marginal contribution
to the welfare. Using mechanism design techniques (that allow us to relate bidders' expected
payos to the allocation rule), we show that this is so when the good is over-assigned to the
incumbent in the sense that he always gets the good when he values it most. Such an observation
allows us to extend our exclusion principle beyond the Vickrey auction and to cover practically
important applications. For example, in the context of procurement auctions where the incumbent
is better at renegotiating the contract than entrants (see Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis (2014)
for a discussion of how important renegotiations are in procurement auctions) then we show that
excluding the incumbent enhances the revenues.
When the seller's objective is the revenues augmented by the incumbent's payo, we show
that the seller never nds it protable to exclude the incumbent in auctions that do not assign
him the good when he does not value it most. Thus, when the incumbent is more reliable than the
entrants (maybe due to asymmetric risks of breakdown), we obtain as a corollary that no-exclusion
is optimal for the seller in the Vickrey auction if she internalizes the incumbent's payo. In a
similar vein, we show in environments without incumbents but two groups of entrants diering
among other things in their reliability that the seller's revenue decreases if the more reliable group
is set aside and if the auction format does not discriminate along that dimension. This result
is a corollary of a more general insight for environments with two groups of potential entrants
saying roughly that if one group is disadvantaged in the auction while the other is advantaged,
8We note that such a nding is of practical importance to the extent that in a dynamic perspective the incumbent
can often be thought of as the current contractor and there is typically one of them.
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then excluding the disadvantaged group decreases the seller's revenue.
Finally, we briey discuss the desirability of exclusion in the context of rst-price auctions
and how our general results could be applied. In environments with a single incumbent and
when the latter has a right of rst refusal allowing him to match the bids of his competitors, we
show that excluding the incumbent increases the seller's revenue. In standard rst-price auctions
(i.e. without right-of-rst-refusal), we observe that excluding the incumbent is good when the
incumbent and entrants' valuations are drawn independently from the same distribution (and a
fortiori so when the incumbent's valuation is drawn from a weaker distribution). By contrast, if
the incumbent's valuation is drawn from a stronger distribution and if the seller's internalizes the
incumbent's payo, then no-exclusion is optimal for the seller.
When moving to multiple incumbents, the determination of the optimal set-asides policy is
more complex, even in the context of the Vickrey auction. Indeed, when there are multiple
incumbents, excluding an incumbent may have an extra detrimental eect not present in the
one incumbent case on the rent left to the other incumbents. When the incumbents' valuation
distributions can be interpreted as arising from collusive rings of entrants of random sizes, we show
that the exclusion of any incumbent has no eect on the rent left to other incumbents (due to the
adjustment of entrants' participation decisions), and thus it is optimal to exclude all incumbents
in this case. For some range of alternative distributional assumptions, we show that excluding an
incumbent increases the rents left to the other incumbents, and we observe then that excluding a
suciently weak incumbent would be detrimental to revenues.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our general model with en-
dogenous entry and illustrates some of our main results through simple examples. Section 3, after
introducing some formal notation, establishes that in the Vickrey auction, no-exclusion is always
optimal from a welfare perspective. Section 4 establishes our main result when there is a single
incumbent and the auction format is the Vickrey auction. Section 5 extends the insight obtained
with one incumbent to other (possibly ex post inecient) formats. Section 6 moves to environ-
ments with multiple incumbents. Section 7 briey considers the case of interdependent values
and whether split awards and entry fees may be preferable to set-asides. Section 8 concludes.
Technical proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 An auction setup with set-asides
2.1 The model
A risk neutral seller S is selling a good through a given auction procedure. Her reservation
value is denoted by XS ≥ 0. When the good is auctioned o through a second-price auction with a
reserve price set at XS , then the auction format is referred to as the Vickrey auction. We assume
that there are two classes of buyers: The incumbents who participate for sure in the auction
(alternatively, we can think of their participation costs as being null) and the potential entrants
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who can submit a bid only if they have incurred an entry cost. The decisions to participate are
made simultaneously by all potential entrants. We allow entrants to come from various groups,
and dierent groups can be characterized both by dierent entry costs and dierent distributions
of valuations. The number of potential entrants is assumed to be large in each group, which allows
us to simplify the analysis (as explained below).
Remark. It should be mentioned that our model is framed as an auction setup in which
buyers are bidding in order to acquire an object. It could obviously be phrased as a procurement
in which the designer seeks to obtain a service from various potential providers. The procurement
interpretation ts better some of our motivations and policy implications developed in Introduc-
tion. It can be observed that for contracts of services that are auctioned o periodically, a bidder
we refer to as an incumbent may be thought of as being the previous holder of the contract, which
will motivate our study of the single incumbent scenario.9
Formally, the various possible buyers and their distributions of valuations and entry costs are
described as follows. There is a nite set of incumbents I. Each incumbent i ∈ I is characterized
by a cumulative distribution F Ii (.|z), from which his valuation is drawn conditional on the realiza-
tion z of some underlying variable Z.10 There are K groups of potential entrants E = {1, . . . ,K}.
Each group is composed of innitely many potential buyers, which will justify our modelling of
entry as following Poisson distributions (see below). A buyer from group k ∈ E has an entry cost
Ck > 0 and his valuation is drawn from the cumulative distribution Fk(.|z) conditional on the
realization z of the underlying variable Z.11 Conditionally on z, the valuations of the various
buyers are assumed to be drawn independently.12 To simplify, we also assume that the supports
of the distributions F Ii (.|z) and Fk(.|z) are uniformly bounded from above by x > XS , but we
make no other assumption on these distributions nor on the distribution of z. We will describe
what bidders observe and at which stage later on.
While our general formulation puts no restriction on the number of groups,13 some of our
results require further restrictions. We say that potential entrants are symmetric if K = 1 (and
then we drop the index k from our notation). We say that all buyers (entrants and incumbents
alike) are symmetric if F Ii (.|z) = Fk(.|z) = F (.|z) for each i ∈ I and k ∈ E .14 For some results
concerning auctions in which there is no weakly dominant strategy, we impose the additional
9In an auction perspective, scarce resources like spectrum may also be auctioned periodically in a way that
makes the incumbency status relevant.
10We assume implicitly that the variable Z belongs to a measurable space and is distributed according to some
probability measure, so as to ensure that the integrals and expectations to be introduced next are well-dened.
11The entry cost Ck can be interpreted equivalently as the expected utility of a group k buyer if he chooses an
outside option (which may consist e.g. in participating in another procurement).
12Given that we impose no specic structure on the variable Z, conditional independence is a general way to
introduce some correlation between buyers' valuations.
13This contrasts with the structural empirical literature that has typically considered two-group cases as e.g. in
Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) and Athey, Coey and Levin (2013). The group structure can thus capture the idea
of pre-entry signals about valuations as in Roberts and Sweeting (2012) or Gentry and Li (2014). The special case
in which Fk(x|z) = 1[x > xk] for any k ∈ E corresponds to the case in which potential entrants from group k know
their valuation xk before entry as in McAfee (1993).
14Levin and Smith (1994) consider a model with symmetric potential entrants and no incumbents.
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restriction that valuations are drawn independently with a common support [x, x] according to
continuously dierentiable distributions (over their common support). We refer to such environ-
ments as Myersonian environments.15
In this paper, we adopt the view that the only instrument of the seller is the set-asides policy.
Formally,
Denition 1 A set-asides policy is a pair (I, E) which designates the set of incumbents I ⊆ I
and the groups of entrants E ⊆ E who are allowed to participate. (I, E) is announced before the
buyers decide whether or not to participate.
Special cases of set-asides policies include: 1) (I, E) = (I, E), which corresponds to no-
exclusion, and 2) (I, E) = (∅, E), which corresponds to excluding all the incumbents. For some
results, we derive the optimal set-asides policy as if the seller were free to choose any (I, E). For
other results, we consider instead whether excluding some specic bidders can be protable for
the seller (and to motivate the latter, we have implicitly in mind that the seller would not be
allowed to exclude some types of buyers). It should be noted that our main results do not rely
on the ability to exclude entrants.
Our main interest in the rest of the paper will be to understand the eect of (I, E) on the
revenue generated by the seller.
The timing of the game is as follows. The auction format is exogenously given. The seller
announces rst her set-asides policy (I, E). Second, potential entrants decide simultaneously
whether or not to participate. At that time, the only information potential entrants have is the
group they come from. Third, participants learn their private valuations so that we are in a
private value environment (see Section 7.1 for an extension to an interdependent value setup).
In general, bidders could be observing signals about others' valuations except in the Myersonian
environment where we assume that bidders observe only their valuation. Fourth, the incumbents
and the entrants who are allowed to participate are playing the auction game. If each bidder
has a weakly dominant strategy (such as bidding one own's valuation in the Vickrey auction),
the auction is referred to as a dominant-strategy auction and we then assume that buyers use
their weakly dominant strategy. According to this terminology, second-price auctions with bid
subsidies but also posted prices are dominant strategy auctions.
In such a case, our analysis is insensitive to the extra information about others' valuations
bidders may receive after entry. We will be more explicit about the needed informational assump-
tions at the auction stage (for example about the number and identities of other participants)
when considering formats in which there is no weakly dominant strategy as the rst-price auction.
A key aspect of our analysis concerns the impact of (I, E) on the participation decisions. Due
to our assumption that there is a large number of potential entrants in each group, the realized
15In this case we drop the variable z from our notation. Alternatively, we can consider the case where z would
be common knowledge among bidders after their entry decisions. What we need when invoking the independence
restriction is that we are in a setup in which, at the auction stage, the payos can be expressed as a function of
the assignment rule as in Myerson (1981).
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number of participants from each group will be distributed according to some Poisson distribution.
Making entry endogenous will require that if the participation rate is positive in a given group,
then the ex ante utility that an entrant from the group derives from participating should match
his entry cost. That is, we assume that the probability that there are nk entrants from group k
for every k ∈ E is equal to e−
∑K
k=1 µ
∗
k ·
∏K
k=1
[µ∗k]
nk
nk!
where the parameters µ∗k, k ∈ E , are determined
in equilibrium so that µ∗k > 0 (resp. µ
∗
k = 0) implies that the expected payo of an entrant from
group k should be equal to (resp. be lower than) his entry cost Ck.
Assuming entry follows a Poisson distribution simplies the exposition but is not essential
for our results. As in Jehiel and Lamy (2015), we could have considered instead a setup with a
large but nite number of potential entrants in each group.16 What matters for our results is
that entrants get an expected payo that is independent of the set-asides policy, which is so in
a symmetric equilibrium of the game with nite but large enough number of potential entrants
because the large number implies that entry with probability 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium
(and thus the expected payo of an entrant is invariably set at the entry cost). It should be
mentioned that empirical works such as Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) or Athey, Coey and Levin
(2013) that develop structural estimations of such models with endogenous entry obtain an average
number of entrants (small rms according to their terminology) below three in the so-called large
sales where large rms are incumbents.17 This suggests that the number of potential entrants
need not be very large to have that the symmetric equilibrium is in mixed strategies. Furthermore,
Athey, Coey and Levin (2013) also argue that pure-strategy equilibria would poorly t the data.
2.2 Simple illustrations of the exclusion principle
To get some ideas about the potential eect of set-asides policies, we develop a few examples
in which we consider the eect of excluding the incumbents.
Example 1a (the Vickrey auction with a single incumbent) Consider that 1) XS = 0,
2) there is a single incumbent whose valuation is denoted by xI > 0, 3) potential entrants are
symmetric and all have the same valuation denoted by xE > 0, and 4) the auction format is the
Vickrey auction. In particular, when at least two entrants participate in the auction, their payos
are null. We also assume that E[xE ] > C in order to guarantee that the problem is not degenerate
(otherwise entry would always be too costly). We do not make any additional restriction on the
joint distribution of (xE , xI). At the time they decide whether or not to enter the auction, we
assume that potential entrants have no information about the realization of (xE , xI).
Let µ∗in (resp. µ
∗
out) denote the equilibrium entry rate when the incumbent is not excluded
(resp. is excluded). Note that if the entry rate is µ, the probability to be the sole entrant in the
16The Poisson distribution corresponds to the limit distribution of the number of entrants of each group of a
model with a nite number of buyers per group taking independent decisions and as the number of buyers in
each group goes to innity (and assuming every individual entrant of a given group follows the same participation
strategy). Jehiel and Lamy (2015) show that the equilibria in the Poisson specication correspond to the limit of
equilibria as the number of potential entrants now assumed to be nite goes to innity.
17Those large sales represent 80% of their timber auction sample. The average number of incumbents is 1.66.
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auction is e−µ > 0. The equilibrium condition requiring that the expected payo of an entrant in
the auction is equal to his entry cost leads to:
e−µ
∗
in · E[max{xE − xI , 0}] = C (1)
if E[max{xE − xI , 0}] > C and µ∗in = 0 otherwise, and18
e−µ
∗
out · E[xE ] = C. (2)
When the incumbent is not excluded, the expected revenue for the seller, denoted byRwith−1−Inc,
is then
e−µ
∗
in · 0 + µ∗ine−µ
∗
in · E[min{xE , xI}] + (1− e−µ
∗
in − µ∗ine−µ
∗
in) · E[xE ] (3)
where the rst term corresponds to the case without any entrant, the second term to the case
with a single entrant and the third term to the case with at least two entrants. Plugging (1) into
(3) we get the alternative expression
Rwith−1−Inc = E[xE ]−
( E[xE ]
E[max{xE − xI , 0}]
+ µ∗in
)
· C (4)
if µ∗in > 0 (otherwise we have Rwith−1−Inc = 0).
When the incumbent is excluded, the expected revenue of the seller, denoted by Rwithout−Inc,
is then (1− e−µ∗out − µ∗oute−µ
∗
out) · E[xE ] and plugging (2) into this expression, we obtain that
Rwithout−Inc = E[xE ]− (1 + µ∗out) · C. (5)
From (1) and (2), we have eµ
∗
out−µ∗in = E[xE ]E[max{xE−xI ,0}] > 1. Since e
x > 1 + x if x > 0, we
obtain nally that 1 + µ∗out − µ∗in <
E[xE ]
E[max{xE−xI ,0}] or equivalently that
Rwithout−Inc > Rwith−1−Inc. (6)
Interestingly, this inequality does not depend on the relative strengths of the entrants and the
incumbent. We will show that the benet of excluding a single incumbent is actually very general
and goes beyond this simple framework with ex-post symmetric entrants. 
In the next example, we illustrate that the advantage of excluding the incumbent is not unique
to the Vickrey format and that it applies to the rst-price auction case in which the incumbent
would have a right to match the best oer of the other participating bidders.
Example 1b (the rst price auction with a right-to-match for the incumbent)
Consider again Example 1 but replace the Vickrey auction with the rst-price auction allowing
the incumbent to submit his bid after observing the bids of the entrants, assuming ties are broken
18The assumption E[xE ] > C guarantees that a solution exists.
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in favor of the incumbent. This gives an obvious second-mover advantage to the incumbent: In
equilibrium, the incumbent bids zero if he knows he is the only bidder in the auction, and he
matches the highest bid of the entrants if his own valuation is higher. Assume also, for simplicity,
that the set of participants in the auction is publicly observed before bidders submit their bids
so that entrants bid xE if they know they face another entrant (in addition to the incumbent).
Let β(xE) denote the equilibrium bid of an entrant when he knows there is no other entrant and
his only competitor is the incumbent. We have naturally β(xE) ≤ xE (since any bid above xE is
weakly dominated). The equilibrium entry condition can be written as
e−µ
∗
in · E[(xE − β(xE)) · 1[xI < β(xE)]] = C (7)
if E[(xE − β(xE)) · 1[xI < β(xE)]] > C and µ∗in = 0 otherwise.19 A similar calculation leads to
the analog of (4) for the seller's expected revenue when µ∗in > 0:
Rwith−1−Inc = E[xE ]−
( E[xE ]
E[(xE − β(xE)) · 1[xI < β(xE)]]
+ µ∗in · γ
)
· C (8)
where γ = E[xE−β(xE)]E[(xE−β(xE))·1[xI<β(xE)]] ≥ 1. Since γ ≥ 1, the previous argument leading to (6)
holds a fortiori. Overall, we obtain that the benet of excluding the incumbent is somehow
reinforced in this auction. Intuitively, a mechanism that advantages the incumbent, or equivalently
disadvantages the entrants, reduces the attractiveness for potential entrants (here formally we
have E[(xE − β(xE)) · 1[xI < β(xE)]] ≤ E[max{xE − xI , 0}]) but also increases the rents of
the incumbent for any given number of entrants (here the expected rents of the incumbent is
E[(xI−β(xE))·1[xI ≥ β(xE)]] which is larger than the corresponding rate E[(xI−xE)·1[xI ≥ xE ]]
in the Vickrey auction).20 
The next two examples explore the eect of set-asides in the presence of multiple incumbents.
For this, we consider again the Vickrey auction.
Example 1c (the Vickrey auction with multiple symmetric incumbents) Consider
again Example 1a but with two (or more) incumbents who have the same valuation ex-post.
From the potential entrants' perspective, one or several incumbents makes no dierence so that
the equilibrium entry rate is equal to the same rate µ∗in as in the case with a single incumbent.
The expression of the seller's revenue, denoted by Rwith−2−Inc, is then
Rwith−2−Inc = e
−µ∗in · E[xI ] + µ∗ine−µ
∗
in · E[xI ] + (1− e−µ
∗
in − µ∗ine−µ
∗
in) · E[max{xE , xI}]. (9)
After some calculation and plugging (1), we obtain that
Rwith−2−Inc = E[max{xE , xI}]− (1 + µ∗in) · C (10)
19We use the notation 1[A] where 1[A] = 1 (resp. 1[A] = 0) if statement A is true (resp. false).
20An interesting feature here is that we can conclude that the exclusion of the incumbent is good even without
solving the equilibrium strategy of the entrants.
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if µ∗in > 0, and Rwith−2−Inc = E[xI ] ≥ E[max{xE , xI}] − C otherwise. Since µ∗in < µ∗out, we
obtain that
Rwith−2−Inc > Rwithout−Inc. (11)
While it was benecial to exclude the incumbent when there was only one, we see that exclusion
may reduce revenues when there are multiple incumbents.
However, contrary to the result with a single incumbent, the impact of excluding the incum-
bents is ambiguous in general when there are multiple incumbents. In particular, the inequality
(11) relies crucially on the implicit assumption that incumbents have no informational rents since
their valuation are perfectly correlated. 
Example 1d (the Vickrey auction with asymmetric incumbents) To deepen the dis-
cussion with multiple incumbents, consider a case with only two incumbents. We now introduce
some asymmetry between the two incumbents: one incumbent, designated as a weak incumbent,
has the valuation xI with probability ε and a null valuation with the remaining probability 1− ε,
the other -strong- incumbent has valuation xI . It is straightforward to see that excluding the
weak incumbent is always detrimental since his presence or absence does not modify the entry
rate while he may reduce the rent of the other incumbent. Whether it is protable to exclude the
strong incumbent and/or both incumbents depends on the strength of the weak incumbent: the
weaker he is, the closer we are to a situation as if there were only one incumbent so that exclusion
is protable. To illustrate how rich the situation can be with multiple incumbents, we provide an
example in the Appendix such that it is detrimental to exclude each incumbent in isolation but
it would be good to exclude both incumbents. 
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Some denitions
In this section, we assume that the auction format is the Vickrey auction. We let N =
(n1, . . . , nK) ∈ NK denote a realization of the prole of entrants, N−k = (n1, . . . , nk−1, nk −
1, nk+1 . . . , nK) and N+k = (n1, . . . , nk−1, nk + 1, nk+1 . . . , nK). For a given (nonempty) set of
incumbents I ⊆ I and i ∈ I, we let I−i = I \ {i}. The following notation will be useful to present
the analysis.
• F (1:N∪I)(x) := EZ [
∏K
k=1 [Fk(x|Z)]nk ·
∏
i∈I F
I
i (x|Z)] denotes the CDF of the rst order
statistic of bidders' valuations among the set N of entrants and the set I ⊆ I of incumbents.
If N = (0, . . . , 0) and I = ∅, then we adopt the convention that F (1:N∪I)(x) = 1.
• P (N |µ) = e−
∑K
k=1 µk ·
∏K
k=1
[µk]
nk
nk!
denotes the probability of the realization N when the
entry rate vector is µ, namely when the Poisson distribution of group k buyer has mean
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µk ≥ 0 for every k ∈ E .
• V entk (N, I) [resp. V inci (N, I)] denotes the expected (interim) gross payo (i.e. without taking
into account the entry costs) of a buyer from group k [resp. the incumbent i ∈ I] when the
set of participants consists of the prole of potential entrants N ∈ NK with nk ≥ 1 [resp.
N ∈ NK ] and the set of incumbents I ⊆ I.
• Πentk (µ, I) =
∑
N∈NK P (N |µ) ·V entk (N+k, I)−Ck denotes the expected (ex ante) payo of a
group k buyer net of the entry cost Ck when the prole of entry rate is µ ∈ RK+ and the set
of incumbents is I ⊆ I.21
• Πinci (µ, I) =
∑
N∈NK P (N |µ) · V inci (N, I) denotes the expected (ex ante) payo of the in-
cumbent i ∈ I when the prole of entry rate is µ ∈ RK+ and the set of incumbents is
I ⊆ I.
For every realization (N, I) of participants, we dene the expected (interim) gross welfare (i.e.
the sum of all agents' utilities excluding the entry costs) by
W (N, I) := XS · F (1:N∪I)(XS) +
∫ x
XS
xdF (1:N∪I)(x)
and the expected (interim) seller's payo (consisting of XS when the good is not sold and the
revenue otherwise) by
Φ(N, I) := W (N, I)−
K∑
k=1
nk · V entk (N, I)−
∑
i∈I
V inci (N, I).
With some abuse of terminology, we refer to Φ(N, I) as revenue in the rest of the paper.
We can now state more formally the conditions for a prole of entry rates µ to be an equilib-
rium. For a given set-asides policy (I, E), we say that an entry prole µ is part of an equilibrium
if µk = 0 for k /∈ E, and for any k ∈ E,
Πentk (µ, I) =
(resp. ≤)
0 if µk >
(resp. =)
0. (12)
Let J(I, E) ⊆ RK+ denote the set of entry proles compatible with equilibrium behavior for
the set-asides policy (I, E), and let µ∗(I, E) ∈ J(I, E) refer to one such equilibrium.22
For a given participation prole µ and a set of incumbents I ⊆ I, we dene the expected (ex
ante) total net welfare (net of the expected entry costs) by
21Note that from the perspective of any entrant no matter what his group k is, the probability that he faces
the set of entrants N (excluding himself) is also equal to P (N |µ). This fundamental property of Poisson games is
referred to as environmental equivalence in Myerson (1998).
22We will establish in the proof of Lemma 3.1 that J(I, E) 6= ∅ for any pair (I, E) so that such an equilib-
rium exists. The participation rates cannot be innite as it would result in negative expected net payos when
participating (since the entry costs Ck are assumed to be strictly positive).
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TW (µ, I) :=
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) ·W (N, I)−
K∑
k=1
µk · Ck (13)
and the corresponding expected revenue by R(µ, I) :=
∑
N∈NK P (N |µ) · Φ(N, I). From the equi-
librium condition (12), the expected revenue of the seller given the set-asides policy (I, E) can be
rewritten as
R(µ∗(I, E), I) = TW (µ∗(I, E), I)−
∑
i∈I
Πinci (µ
∗(I, E), I). (14)
We are interested in how TW (µ∗(I, E), I) and R(µ∗(I, E), I) vary with the set-asides policy
(I, E). Clearly, TW (µ, I) and R(µ, I) are increasing in the set of incumbents I for a given µ
because, in the Vickrey auction, the good is allocated to the agent who values the good most and
the payment when the good is sold can only increase when there are more participants. Forbidding
the access of some incumbents would a priori boost the participation rate of the potential entrants,
which would be favorable both to TW and R. The question is how the two eects aggregate.
3.2 Welfare criterion
When the criterion is welfare, we show that it is never good to exclude incumbents or entrants.
The following lemma is a key property used repeatedly in our analysis. For any set I of allowed
incumbents, the equilibrium entry prole must be one that maximizes the welfare given I. While
Jehiel and Lamy (2015) establish this result in environments without incumbents, the extension
to the case with incumbents is straightforward.23
Lemma 3.1 µ∗(I, E) ∈ Argmaxµ∈RK+ TW (µ, I) 6= ∅ for any I ⊆ I.
To help understand some of the following results, we now provide a sketch of the key steps in
the proof (while for completeness a full proof appears in the Appendix). A fundamental property
of the Vickrey auction is that the ex post utility of each bidder corresponds exactly to his marginal
contribution to the welfare.24 Applied to a potential entrant from group k, this implies (from an
interim perspective) that
W (N+k, I)−W (N, I) = V entk (N+k, I). (15)
From an ex ante perspective and given the Poisson model, such a property translates into:
∂TW (µ, I)
∂µk
=
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) · V entk (N+k, I)− Ck = Πentk (µ, I). (16)
23The result holds true for all sets of incumbents because from the viewpoint of entrants as well as from the
welfare viewpoint, the presence of incumbents is equivalent to that of a seller with a stochastic reservation value
(see Lamy (2013) for the analysis of the Vickrey auction with endogenous entry when the reserve price is randomly
determined).
24The rst work on auctions with entry having stressed this property is Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1993).
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That is, the entry proles resulting from equilibrium behavior correspond to local maxima of the
total welfare function. The nal step in the proof consists in showing that the function µ →
TW (µ, I) is globally concave, thereby ensuring that any local maximum is a global maximum.25
Since TW (µ, I) is non-decreasing in I, it follows that maxµ∈RK+
TW (µ, I) is also non-decreasing
in I. From Lemma 3.1, we obtain then that excluding incumbents can only reduce the total wel-
fare. Hence, the rst-best welfare maxµ∈RK+
TW (µ, I) can be implemented with the no-exclusion
policy.
Proposition 3.2 In the Vickrey auction, the welfare-optimal set-asides policy involves no exclu-
sion.
While this subsection is concerned with welfare, we make the following three basic observations
concerning revenues. If there are no incumbents, the total net welfare and the seller's revenue
coincide as shown in (14). As a corollary of Proposition 3.2, we have that
Corollary 3.3 In the Vickrey auction without incumbents, the revenue-optimal set-asides policy
involves no exclusion.26
We refer to cases in which the rents of incumbents are null, i.e. V inci (N, I) = 0 for any
N ∈ NK and i ∈ I, as situations with full competition among incumbents. Obviously, several
incumbents are required for this to be true and it typically arises as illustrated in Example 1c
when there are several incumbents with the same highest valuations. In the full competition
among incumbents case, we get from (14) that maxµ∈RK+
TW (µ, I) is an upper bound on the
seller's expected revenue. Since Proposition 3.2 has established that this bound is reached by the
seller under the no exclusion policy, we can extend an observation made in Example 1c:
Corollary 3.4 In the Vickrey auction with full competition among incumbents, the revenue-
optimal set-asides policy involves no exclusion.
When there is a single incumbent, it may be the case that the incumbent is an organization
owned by the seller (e.g. another public administration in public procurements) in which case the
designer's objective corresponds to the seller's revenue augmented by the payo of the incumbent.
This case is next referred to as the case where the seller internalizes the incumbent's payo.
The seller's objective then coincides with welfare in equilibrium given that entrants' payos are
determined by their participation costs. In the Vickrey auction, the revenue-optimal set-asides
policy thus involves no exclusion in this case, as in the case without incumbents.
25The entry game presents some analogy with the theory of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996)
and we know from it that any global maximum of the potential function constitutes an equilibrium and that
the converse is true if the potential function is concave (Neyman, 1997). The game where a nite set of players
makes (simultaneous) pre-participation investments before bidding in a Vickrey auction corresponds precisely to a
potential game where the potential function is the welfare. A similar observation (implicitly) appears in Bergemann
and Välimäki (2002) who derive from it the existence of an ecient equilibrium both from an ex ante and an ex post
perspective. Technically, there is still a dierence in our environment since the Poisson model involves implicitly
a continuum of players.
26Jehiel and Lamy (2015) adopt a mechanism design approach à la Myerson (1981) and show the much stronger
result that the Vickrey auction is the optimal mechanism when there are no incumbents.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Theorem 1 when K = 1
4 The Vickrey auction with a single incumbent
4.1 Excluding a single incumbent boosts revenues
In the presence of one or several incumbents, revenue maximization involves a trade-o between
welfare maximization and the minimization of the rents of the incumbents (as reected by (14)).
On the one hand, from Proposition 3.2, set-asides impact negatively the revenue through the
welfare term. On the other hand, excluding incumbents can serve the purpose of eliminating the
rents of these. Although it is in general unclear what the direction of the trade-o is, it turns
out that when there is a single incumbent, excluding the incumbent is always good for revenues
in the Vickrey auction.
In words, the argument is as follows. In the Vickrey auction, for any realization of the prole
of entrants, the expected rent of the incumbent coincides exactly with his marginal contribution
to the welfare (this is the fundamental property of the Vickrey auction already used for entrants
to prove Lemma 3.1). We obtain then (from eq. (14)) that the expected revenue of the seller
coincides with the (hypothetical) total welfare were the incumbent to be absent. Since the latter
welfare is maximized when the incumbent is excluded and all entrants -whatever their group- are
allowed to participate, we obtain:
Theorem 1 When there is a single incumbent, the revenue-optimal set-asides policy in the Vick-
rey auction consists in excluding the incumbent and allowing entrants whatever their group to
participate. That is, the revenue-maximizing set-asides policy is (I, E) = (∅, E).
When there is a single group of entrants, the following proof is illustrated in Figure 1. The
revenue gain for exclusion comes from the gap between µ∗(∅, E) ≡ µ∗out and µ∗({i}, E) ≡ µ∗in.
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Proof Since the ex post utility of the incumbent coincides with his marginal contribution to
the welfare, we obtain the analog of (15) but for an incumbentW (N, I)−W (N, I−i) = V inci (N, I)
for any realization N of the prole of entrants, and then from an ex ante perspective
Πinci (µ, I) = TW (µ, I)− TW (µ, I−i) (17)
which can be viewed as the analog of (16). Plugged into (14) and for environment with a single
incumbent, we obtain that for any set-asides policy (I, E),27 that the revenue of the seller is given
by
R(µ∗(I, E), I) = TW (µ∗(I, E), ∅) ≤ TW (µ∗(∅, E), ∅) = R(µ∗(∅, E), ∅) (18)
where the middle inequality comes from Lemma 3.1. Q.E.D.
4.2 When the incumbent must be in
In some cases, it may be that the seller is not allowed to exclude the incumbent. One may then
be interested in whether or not it is good for revenues to exclude some groups of entrants from
the auction. Obviously, if there is only one group of entrant, this cannot be good as excluding
the entrants would reduce the revenues to XS (and the seller is bound to get more than XS
in the Vickrey auction with positive participation). When there are several groups of entrants,
one might have thought based on Theorem 1 that it is not a good idea to exclude any group of
entrants. This turns out to be incorrect as illustrated in the following example.
Example 2 Consider one incumbent having for sure valuation xI . Consider two groups of
potential entrants. With probability q ∈ (0, 1), all entrants have the high valuation xE > xI .
With probability 1 − q, entrants from group 1 (resp. 2) have the low valuation x1E < xI (resp.
x2E < xI). We assume that x
1
E < x
2
E and that their entry costs, denoted by Ck for k = 1, 2, are
such that C1 < C2 with the dierence C2−C1 being small enough as made precise below. We also
assume that xE−xI > C2, which guarantees that some entry arises in equilibrium. The expected
gross prot of an entrant is the same whether he comes from group 1 or group 2. However,
since the entry cost is bigger in group 2 than in group 1, when there are no set-asides, then only
bidders from group 1 participate. Formally, the prole of equilibrium entry rates (µ1, µ2) without
set-asides is such that
q · e−µ1(xE − xI) = C1
and µ2 = 0. By contrast, when bidders from group 1 are excluded then the equilibrium entry rate
of group 2 is given by µ̃2 such that
q · e−µ̃2(xE − xI) = C2.
27Namely, either if I = {i} or if I = ∅.
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As the dierence C2 − C1 gets small, we have that µ̃2 ≈ µ1. The welfare is smaller with
exclusion (as we already know from Proposition 3.2), but the dierence becomes negligible here.
However, given that x1E < x
2
E , the seller's revenue is larger when group 1 is excluded (and the
dierence, which is approximately equal to (1− e−µ1) · (1− q) · (x2E − x1E) > 0, is non negligible
when C2 − C1 gets small). 
In the above example, there is a discrepancy between the eect of an entrant on the reduction
of the rents of the incumbent and his eect on the increase of the welfare. Group 2's bidders
are more eective for the former while group 1's bidders are more eective for the latter. It is
then intuitive that it can be protable to exclude those potential participants who have a greater
ability to increase the welfare (so that they will enter without exclusion and discourage the other
group to participate) but less ability to reduce the incumbent's rents.
Understanding further which groups of entrants should be excluded when the incumbent is
present is not straightforward given the potential complex eect of E on the participation rates.
To illustrate some counter-intuitive eects, Example 3 in Appendix shows that it may be good to
exclude a group that is dominated both in terms of entry costs and in terms of the distribution
of valuations by another group.28
4.3 Simple extensions of the exclusion principle
Several remarks in relation to the exclusion principle are in order. First, for any general assign-
ment problem and private value environments with quasi-linear utilities, the exclusion principle
of Theorem 1 extends. The mechanism should be the pivot mechanism that requires ecient
assignments and that participants pay the welfare loss their presence imposes on others. If there
are no incumbents, the designer can be shown to achieve the highest possible revenue in the pivot
mechanism if we assume she can coordinate entry on the equilibrium she likes best (see Jehiel and
Lamy (forthcoming)). As a corollary, the exclusion principle of Theorem 1 follows for exactly the
same reasons as in the one-object case given that an economic agent who participates for sure
(the incumbent) would still grab his marginal contribution to the welfare in the pivot mechanism.
Such an observation applies to multi-object generalized Vickrey auction as discussed in greater
details in Section 7.2. It applies also to settings in which there would be costs attached to the
processing of bids in which case the pivot mechanism would include a fee equal to the processing
cost on the top of the second-price auction with a reserve price equal to XS .
29
28The intuition is the following: The example relies on a strong group where valuations among bidders are
perfectly correlated and a weak group where valuations are drawn independently of each other. Due to the perfect
correlation in the strong group, bidders do not enter much in equilibrium (because their payo are null when two
of them enter). By contrast, the equilibrium level is higher in the weak group (which is useful to reduce the rents of
the incumbent when the latter wins the auction but has to pay the highest valuation among his competitors) which
counterbalances at the end the fact that for a given set of competitors, bidders from the strong group increase
more the revenue than those from the weak group.
29We note that if entry fees can not be used, processing costs would provide a direct motive for set-asides, even
when participation is exogenous. In a related vein, and in contrast with Myerson (1981), Crémer, Spiegel and
Zheng (2007) show in a dynamic mechanism framework with exogenous entry but processing costs that set-asides
could be benecial. Their result relies on the possibility to solicit bids in a sequential way, a channel for exclusion
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Second, instead of considering innite populations of entrants in each group (this has led us
to adopt the Poisson formulation), the exclusion result of Theorem 1 would similarly hold in a
model with a nite number of potential entrants in each group as considered in Jehiel and Lamy
(2015) provided that (i) each group is suciently large so that entry with probability 1 is not an
equilibrium whatever the group in the seller's most preferred (symmetric) equilibrium, (ii) dierent
entrants from the same group participate with the same probability (symmetry assumption) and
(iii) the seller is able to guarantee that the prole of equilibrium entry probabilities, when the
incumbent is out, is the one she prefers (among equilibrium ones).30
Third, our exclusion principle is robust to the introduction of ex-ante heterogeneities between
bidders of the same group (e.g. if entry costs dier across bidders as in Krasnokutskaya and
Seim (2011)) provided that the rents those heterogeneities induce are limited. Formally and as
argued in Jehiel and Lamy (2015), if the sum of those rents are bounded by ε in an environment
without incumbents, then the revenue gain from switching from the Vickrey auction to the optimal
mechanism is bounded by ε. This further implies that excluding the incumbent induces at worst
a revenue loss of ε.
Fourth, assuming the seller cannot use reserve prices, Theorem 1 extends straightforwardly
to the extent that the incumbent's valuation is always positive. In the second price auction
without reserve price, the seller's revenue corresponds to her revenue as if her true valuation were
0 augmented by the probability that the good remains unsold times XS . As a direct application
of Theorem 1, the rst term is maximized when the incumbent is excluded. We conclude after
noting that the second term is also maximized when the incumbent is excluded given that when
the incumbent's valuation is positive, the good is always sold when he is in.31
5 Beyond the Vickrey auction
In some procurement applications, bidders are not treated symmetrically. For example, some
bidders may be better at renegotiating the terms of the contracts, thereby giving them an advan-
tage at the auction stage (winning at the same nominal price would translate in a lower eective
price for such bidders). Or bidders may be asymmetric in the risk of breakdown. In other cases,
some bidders may be allowed to bid after seeing the oers of others, thereby giving them a second-
mover advantage. In all such cases in which bidders may be treated asymmetrically, the auction
format cannot be viewed as being equivalent to the Vickrey auction, and it is of interest to analyze
whether and when excluding the incumbent or some groups of entrants may be benecial to the
seller.
that is absent in our model.
30This would also correspond to an equilibrium selection that is popular in game theory when one deals with a
potential game (as it is the case here and where the potential function is the welfare net of the entry costs, see
footnote 25): it consists of selecting the equilibrium that maximizes globally (and not only locally) the potential
(see Haufbauer and Sorger (1999) and Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean (2014)).
31More generally, the argument extends as long as the reserve price is below the seller's valuation while the
incumbent's valuation is always above it.
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Our rst insight in this Section is derived from the following observation. A simple inspection
of the argument used to prove Theorem 1 reveals that the benet of excluding the incumbent
carries over to situations in which the rent obtained by the incumbent is no smaller than his
marginal contribution to the welfare (in the Vickrey auction, it is just equal) and the good would
be allocated eciently among the entrants when the incumbent is out. We identify classes of
auction formats in which this would be the case so that excluding the incumbent is revenue-
enhancing: Such classes roughly correspond to formats in which the incumbent always gets the
good when he values it most. In a related vein, we establish that when there is a single group
of entrants and the auction format is such that the incumbent never gets the good when he does
not value it most while an entrant always gets it when he values it most, then excluding the
incumbent is detrimental when the seller internalizes the incumbent's payo. In order to cover
also the exclusion of groups of entrants, we also consider mechanisms that over-assign the good to
the entrants from a rst group and under-assign the good to the entrants from the second group,
and we show that it is never good to exclude the entrants from this second group.
After deriving our results within an abstract class of mechanisms in which bidders have a
(weakly) dominant strategy, we show how these results can be used in more concrete applications.
We also discuss the implications of our results beyond dominant-strategy auctions, in particular
when rst-price auctions are used.
5.1 Denitions
An assignment rule, denoted by φ, is a function which maps any realization of bidders' valua-
tions to a vector of probabilities characterizing the probability that each participant receives the
good. We say that an assignment rule is deterministic if the vectors of probabilities are composed
only of 0 and 1. E.g. the assignment rule associated to the Vickrey auction is one that assigns
probability one to the participant (including the seller herself) who has the highest valuation.32
Denition 2 For a given assignment rule, we say that the good is over-assigned (resp. under-
assigned) to a bidder if this bidder gets the good with probability 1 [resp. 0] whenever (ex post)
eciency dictates to assign (resp. not to assign) it to him.
Relatedly, we will say that an auction over-assigns (resp. under-assigns) the good to a given
bidder if in the associated assignment rule (resulting from equilibrium behavior), the good is
over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to the given bidder. For auctions in which bidders have
a dominant strategy, we will use the assignment rule φ induced by the auction mechanism to
designate the auction format.33
32When several bidders have the same valuation in the Vickrey auction, it does not matter how to break ties in
terms of bidders payos.
33In general, this terminology is abusive because it relies on the endogenous equilibrium behavior induced by
the auction rules.
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Let us illustrate the previous denition with a class of assignment rules when there is at most
one incumbent. Consider r ∈ R+ and b : [r,∞)→ [XS ,∞) an increasing and continuous function
with b(r) = XS . Let us dene an assignment rule φ(b, r) in the following way:
34
• When all entrants have a valuation below XS and the incumbent has a valuation below r,
the seller keeps the good,
• When the incumbent has a valuation below r and there is at least one entrant with a
valuation strictly above XS , the good is assigned to the entrant with the highest valuation,
• When the incumbent has a valuation strictly above r and there is no entrant with a valuation
strictly above XS , the good is assigned to the incumbent,
• When the incumbent has a valuation xI strictly above r and the highest valuation among
the entrants xE is strictly above XS , the good is assigned to the incumbent if b(xI) ≥ xE
and to the entrant with the highest valuation otherwise.
It is readily veried that the good is over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to the incumbent in
a φ(r, b)-assignment rule with b(x) ≥ x and r ≤ XS (resp. b(x) ≤ x and r ≥ XS). The assignment
rule associated to the Vickrey auction is the knife-edge case where r = XS and b(x) = x.
This construction is illustrated in Figure 2 in which two assignment rules are depicted in bold.
The assignment rule φ(r, b) delineates three areas: in the red rectangle the seller keeps the good,
above the bold line associated to b and above the red rectangle the entrant with the highest
valuation gets the good, below the bold line associated to b and on the right to the red rectangle
the incumbent gets the good. This assignment rule is inecient. More precisely, ineciencies
occur when we are in the shaded area: the incumbent gets the good although eciency would
dictate to put it in the hands of another agent (an entrant or the seller herself). In this assignment
rule, the good is over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to the incumbent (resp. the entrants).
The assignment rule φMyerson depicts the one associated to the optimal mechanism in a
Myersonian environment with the regularity assumption that the function x → x − 1−F
I(x)
fI(x)
is increasing, as characterized in Jehiel and Lamy (2015). The good is under-assigned to the
incumbent and over-assigned to the entrants.35
5.2 Some fundamental properties
It is well-known in mechanism design that bidders' expected rents are characterized (either
for dominant-strategy mechanisms or for general mechanisms in Myersonian environments) by
34If the incumbent is excluded then it corresponds to say that he has a null valuation so that he never gets the
good. Similarly, if there is no entrants we adopt the convention that the highest valuation among the entrants is
null.
35More precisely, we have φMyerson = φ(rMyerson, bMyerson) where rMyerson denotes the solution to rMyerson −
1−F I (rMyerson)
fI (rMyerson)
= XS and the function b
Myerson(x) = x− 1−F
I (x)
fI (x)
≤ x where F I (resp. fI) denotes the CDF (resp.
PDF) of the incumbent's valuation.
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Figure 2: Examples of φ(r, b)-assignment rules
the assignment rule and the expected monetary transfers of bidders with the lowest type. In
the next results (up to Section 5.5), we consider so-called dominant-strategy auctions without
participation fees, i.e. dominant-strategy auctions such that the transfer of a bidder with zero
valuation is null.
When comparing the seller's revenue in auction formats under exogenous participation, a
crucial element is how bidders' payos vary with the assignment rule. From standard arguments
in mechanism design, it is well-known that the more a bidder gets the good the larger his payo.
Limiting bidders' payo pushes thus in favor of sometimes not assigning the good to a bidder
although it would be ecient to do so. When comparing the seller's revenue, e.g. with respect to
the set-asides policy, under endogenous participation, what matters is no longer bidders' payos
per se (they are xed exogenously for the entrants) but rather whether bidders' payos are larger
or smaller than their marginal contribution to the welfare. The aim of the next lemmas is to
relate the dierence between bidders' rents and their marginal contribution to the welfare to the
notions of over- or under-assigning the good to some bidders. Those results are intuitive and use
standard mechanism design techniques. Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that as far as we
know they do not appear in the previous literature and could potentially be useful beyond the
present study of set-asides.
Lemma 5.1 In a dominant-strategy auction without participation fees that over-assigns (resp.
under-assigns) the good to a given incumbent i and that always assigns the good eciently among
the remaining bidders and the seller, the payo of incumbent i is larger (resp. smaller) than his
marginal contribution to the welfare.
In other words, for any realization of bidders' valuations, if the good is over-assigned (resp.
under-assigned) to incumbent i, then he grabs more (resp. less) than the ex post surplus he
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brings by his presence. Formally, after adapting our notation about the welfare and payo func-
tions to make them depend on the assignment rule φ associated to the given dominant-strategy
auction, we obtain W (N, I;φ)−W (N, I−i;φ) ≤ V inci (N, I;φ) (resp. W (N, I;φ)−W (N, I−i;φ) ≥
V inci (N, I;φ)) if the good is over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to the incumbent i ∈ I and if
the auction always assigns the good eciently among the remaining bidders and the seller.
From an ex ante perspective, when the good is over-assigned to incumbent i ∈ I, we obtain
then for any entry prole µ that
TW (µ, I;φ)− TW (µ, I−i;φ) ≤ Πinci (µ, I;φ). (19)
As an illustration, assume there is a single incumbent (I is a singleton) and consider a dominant
strategy auction without participation fees that implements a φ(b, r)-assignment rule. If we
let Gµ(.) denote the CDF of the highest valuation among the entrants when the entry prole
is µ ∈ RK+ , assuming the incumbent's valuation is distributed independently of the entrants'
valuation, standard calculation leads to (see the Appendix for details)
TW (µ, I;φ(b, r))−TW (µ, ∅;φ(b, r)) = Πinc(µ, I;φ(b, r))+(r−XS)·Gµ(XS)·(1−F I(r))
(20)
+
∫ ∞
r
(x− b(x)) · (1− F I(x)) · d[Gµ(b(x))].
It is clear from the previous expression that the more the good is assigned to the incumbent
(when b(x) gets larger and r smaller), the wider is the discrepancy between his payo and his
marginal contribution to the welfare.
As will prove useful when considering the exclusion of (some groups of) entrants, a similar
argument can be developed to compare a given bidder's payo to his marginal contribution to the
welfare in the class of loser neutral assignment rules. In words, those rules require that if a given
bidder does not win the auction (or equivalently is a loser), then the way the good is assigned
among his opponents does not depend on his own report and is the same as if he were excluded
from the auction.
Formally, letting φi(x1, · · · , xn) denote the probability that bidder i (with valuation xi) gets
the good in the assignment rule φ, loser neutrality is dened as:
Denition 3 An assignment rule is loser neutral if for any vector X := (x1, · · · , xn) and any
bidder i such that φi(X) < 1, we have φj(X) = (1− φi(X)) · φj(X−i) for any j 6= i where
X−i := (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn).
We have:
Lemma 5.2 In a loser neutral dominant-strategy auction without participation fees that over-
assigns (resp. under-assigns) the good to a given bidder, the payo of the given bidder is larger
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(resp. smaller) than his marginal contribution to the welfare.
5.3 Set-asides in dominant-strategy auctions
As an application of Lemma 5.1, the payo of the incumbent is always larger than his marginal
contribution to the welfare in auctions that over-assigns the good to the incumbent. This implies
that the seller's revenue is still bounded from above by the total welfare maximizing solution in
the absence of the incumbent (specifying that the good is allocated to the agent -entrant or seller-
with highest valuation and participation rates are dened to maximize total expected welfare).36
Since such an upper bound on revenues is reached by excluding the incumbent and keeping all
groups of entrants, we obtain the following result, which constitutes a generalization of Theorem
1.
Theorem 2 Consider an environment with a single incumbent and a dominant-strategy auction
without participation fees where the good is over-assigned to the incumbent and that always assigns
the good eciently among the remaining bidders and the seller. The revenue-optimal set-asides
policy consists in excluding the incumbent and allowing all groups of entrants to participate.
When there is a single group of entrants, Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 3: We note rst
that in contrast to the Vickrey auction, excluding the incumbent may be welfare-improving (this
is so for sure if TW (µ, {i};φ) < TW (µ∗out, ∅), for each µ ≥0) when the good is over-assigned to the
incumbent. Note incidentally that for any kind of auctions that assign the good eciently among
entrants, if exclusion is welfare-improving, it is for sure revenue-improving. For the revenue,
exclusion is even more protable for two reasons: On the one hand, the equilibrium revenue with
the incumbent i will stand on the curve TW (., {i};φ) − Πinci (., {i};φ) which is now below the
curve TW (., ∅). On the other hand, if the good is over-assigned to the incumbent the entry rate
is reduced compared to the Vickrey auction: µ∗({i}, φ) < µ∗({i}) and so we stand more on the
left of the TW (., {i};φ)−Πinci (., {i};φ) curve.
Assume now that the objective is the seller's revenue augmented with the incumbent's payo.
As a mirror of Theorem 2, if the assignment favors entrants with respect to the incumbent, it is
intuitive that it would be optimal to keep a fortiori the incumbent.
Theorem 3 Consider an environment with a single incumbent, a single group of entrants (K = 1)
with W (1, ∅) > XS + C and a dominant-strategy auction without participation fees such that the
good is under-assigned to the incumbent and over-assigned to the entrants and such that the prob-
ability to win the good for an entrant with a given signal weakly (resp. strictly) decreases when
an extra entrant (resp. the incumbent) participates.37 If the seller's objective is her revenue aug-
mented with the incumbent's payo, then the seller is strictly worst-o by excluding the incumbent.
36It is implicit throughout our analysis that µ∗(I, E;φ) is well dened (namely that an equilibrium exists) for
the class of auctions φ we consider. See Jehiel and Lamy (2015) for a proof of existence for a very general class of
mechanisms.
37This last assumption does not depend solely on the assignment rule, but also possibly on the underlying
valuation distributions. In φ(r, b)-assignment rules, note that the probability to win the good can not increase with
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Figure 3: Illustration of Theorem 2 when K = 1
The intuition for why excluding the incumbent lowers the welfare is as follows: since the
good is over-assigned to the entrants, it must be that the entry rate is above the ecient one.
Furthermore, excluding the incumbent will increase the entry rate and thus further moves away
from the ecient one. Last given that the good is under-assigned to the incumbent, for any given
entrant rate, the welfare with the incumbent is above the welfare if the incumbent were excluded.
Turning to entrants, we can show making use of Lemma 5.2 that in the absence of incumbents
and with two groups of entrants, if the good is over-assigned to bidders in one group and under-
assigned to the bidders in the other group, then it is detrimental for revenues to exclude bidders
from the latter (somehow disadvantaged) group.
Theorem 4 Consider environments without incumbents and with two groups of entrants (K = 2)
and assume that the equilibria played are the ones that are most preferred by the seller. Consider
a loser neutral dominant strategy auction without participation fees. If the good is under-assigned
to bidders from group 1 while being over-assigned to bidders from group 2, then it can only be
detrimental to exclude bidders from group 1.
The intuition for Theorem 4 is as follows. Suppose group 1's participation rate could be decided
freely while group 2's rate would adjust accordingly. Letting this participation rate vary from its
equilibrium level (without set-asides) to zero, it can be shown that the total welfare -or equivalently
the seller's revenue- would decrease along the path. The decrease is the result of two eects that
go in the same direction: rst, a marginal decrease of group 1's participation is detrimental to the
welfare ceteris paribus since those bidders grab less surplus than their contribution to the social
an extra competitor. Indeed, what is used in the proof are the weaker conditions that the expected payo of an
entrant weakly (resp. strictly) decreases ceteris paribus when an extra entrant (resp. the incumbent) participates.
Those sucient conditions on the expected payo function are actually often easier to check, e.g. in rst-price
auctions.
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welfare. Second, there is an indirect eect of such a decrease: it increases group 2's participation
which is detrimental to the welfare since those bidders grab more surplus than their contribution
to the social welfare.
5.4 Applications of Theorems 2, 3 and 4
Theorems 2, 3 and 4 can be used to shed light on a variety of applications in which bidders are
not treated alike. We rst consider the case of procurements in which the terms of the contracts
can be renegotiated after the auction stage and the incumbent would be better than the entrants
at such renegotiations. We next consider the possibility that bidders may go bankrupt after the
auction in which case the contract promised at the auction stage would not be honored, and we
allow for asymmetries in the risk of bankruptcy. Such considerations are of primary importance
in the context of procurement auctions as reported among others in Spulber (1990).
5.4.1 Asymmetric renegotiation abilities
Renegotiation is an important dimension of procurements as emphasized by Bajari, Houghton
and Tadelis (2014). There is typically an important discrepancy between initial bids and nal
payments,38 where the discrepancy comes from the fact that contracts are renegotiated due to
unforseen contingencies that require adaptation costs. Bajari et al. (2014) argue that adapta-
tion costs are of larger magnitude than the losses due to imperfect competition at the auction
stage. Importantly, rms are not on equal footing to obtain good deals at the renegotiation stage
(presumably incumbents who have more familiarity are better at obtaining good deals). Such
asymmetries at the renegotiation stage lead to asymmetric bidding behaviors at the auction stage
despite the fact that the auction format seems to be treating all bidders in the same way.
Let us consider a very simple reduced-form model of renegotiation in the Vickrey auction.
Each bidder i has some ability to renegotiate the nal price, which is modeled as follows. Let
βi : [ri,∞)→ [XS ,∞) denote an increasing function such that if bidder i wins the auction and is
supposed to pay p ≥ XS then the eective price after renegotiation is β−1i (p) ≥ ri ≡ β
−1
i (XS).
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Note that ri can be interpreted as the eective reserve price bidder i faces. Due to the renegotiation
stage and assuming that bidders perfectly anticipate the discrepancy between the nal bid and
the eective price they will pay, bidders no longer have an incentive to bid their valuation: it is
now a weakly dominant strategy for bidder i to bid βi(x) for any valuation x ≥ ri and to not
participate otherwise. If all bidders have the same ability to renegotiate (i.e. the same function
β) and if the corresponding eective reserve price is r = XS , then the second-price auction with
the reserve price XS implements the true Vickrey auction payos, namely the ones corresponding
to bidders' marginal contribution to the welfare, and we can still apply Theorem 1. But, when
38One of the most spectacular example is Sydney opera house budgeted at an initial cost of $7 million and ended
up costing more than $100 million (see Flyvbjerg (2005) for practical elements on cost overruns).
39It does not matter that the eective price paid ex post is a deterministic function of the nal auction price.
We only need to interpret β−1i (p) as the expected price that bidder i would pay if the nal price in the auction is p.
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bidders dier in terms of ability to renegotiate, there is now some ineciency at the auction stage,
and it is of interest to analyze what these ineciencies imply in terms of the desirability of the
exclusion of some bidders.
Consider two bidders i and j. We say that bidder i is a better renegotiator than bidder j if
βi(x) ≥ βj(x) for any x ≥ rj and if ri ≤ rj . Consider rst environments in which all entrants have
a (common) ability to renegotiate that may dier from that of the incumbent. Specically, let
βent denote the renegotiation function for entrants that applies to all groups, and let βinc denote
the renegotiation function for the incumbent. If βinc(x) 6= βent(x) for some x in bidders' valuation
distribution, then the second price auction with reserve price XS is no longer ex post ecient.
If βinc(x) ≥ βent(x) and rinc ≤ XS = rent, the good is over-assigned to the incumbent while the
auction is ecient among entrants and the seller, and we can then apply Theorem 2.
Corollary 5.3 If the incumbent is a better renegotiator ex-post (βinc(x) ≥ βent(x), for any x ≥
rent, and rinc ≤ rent) and if rent = XS, then the revenue-optimal set-asides policy consists in
excluding the incumbent in the second-price auction with reserve price XS.
Similarly, we can apply Theorem 3:
Corollary 5.4 Assume that there is a single group of entrants who are better renegotiators ex-
post than the incumbent (βinc(x) ≤ βent(x)) and rent = rint = XS.40 If the seller internalizes the
payo of the incumbent, then the optimal set-asides policy for the seller consists in no-exclusion
in the second-price auction with reserve price XS.
Consider next environments without incumbents and with two groups of entrants (K = 2)
having asymmetric abilities to renegotiate. Let βient denote the function that characterizes the
ability to renegotiate of entrants from group i = 1, 2. If β2ent(x) ≥ β1ent(x) (for any x ≥ r1ent)
and r2ent ≤ XS ≤ r1ent, then the good is under-assigned (resp. over-assigned) to the entrants from
group 1 (resp. 2) and we can apply Theorem 4.
Corollary 5.5 Suppose there are two groups of entrants, that entrants from group 2 are better
renegotiators than entrants from group 1 and that r2ent ≤ XS ≤ r1ent. Then it is detrimental to
exclude bidders from group 1 in the second-price auction with reserve price XS.
41
Comment. In some procurements, bid subsidies42 are used to favor some kinds of bidders,
e.g. domestic bidders or small businesses. In practice, it typically takes the form of linear bid
subsidies: it means that if a favored bidder wins the auction at price p, he will pay only (1− α)p
where α ∈ (0, 1). A bid subsidy is then analogous to an ex-post renegotiation as just formalized
and the above analysis can equally be applied to such contexts.
40This last assumption guarantees also that excluding the entrants is not protable since the revenue is guaranteed
to be above XS and is stuck at XS if there is a single bidder.
41We still need an equilibrium selection. To alleviate the presentation we omit it here as in our subsequent
corollaries of Theorem 4 .
42See Athey, Coey and Levin (2013), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) and Marion (2007).
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5.4.2 Asymmetric risks of bankruptcy
Aside from renegotiation, another major concern in procurement auctions is the risk of
bankrupcy, and dierent rms may have dierent risks of bankrupcy (see Spagnolo (2012) and
Saussier and Tirole (2015)).43 Several works have formalized the risk of failure (see e.g. Zheng
(2001), Board (2007), Burguet, Ganuza and Hauk (2012)) through models in which the winner has
the option to not realize the project ex post at a stage where the rm gets better informed about
its cost. In that literature, the risk of failure is endogenous to the contract to the extent that
the exit option is exerted dierently depending on the terms of the contract at the auction stage
(that aect the overall protability of the rm). By contrast we consider below a simpler model
in which the risk of bankruptcy is unrelated to what happens at the auction stage. Our model ts
better situations in which the risks of breakdown are not driven by the considered procurement
assumed to be small in regard of the activity of the rm. For simplicity, we also assume that
there are no monetary transfers if bankruptcy occurs in which case the seller is assumed to keep
the good. In terms of welfare, this means that when a bidder with valuation x has a probability
p to go bankrupt, then the corresponding eective valuation to be counted for the contribution
to welfare, referred to as the correct valuation, is (1− p) · x+ p ·XS .
In an auction where payments occur only when there is no bankruptcy, the risk of bankruptcy
does not play any role in the bidding incentives. In particular, in the second-price auction, for each
bidder it is still a dominant strategy to bid his valuation. If all bidders have the same probability
of default, then the second-price auction with reserve price XS implements the Vickrey auction
payos with respect to the correct valuation and we can apply Theorem 1. We now discuss cases
where bidders dier in terms of risks of bankruptcy.
Consider rst environments without incumbents and with two groups of entrants (K = 2).
The probability to go bankrupt for entrants from group i = 1, 2 is denoted by pient ∈ [0, 1]. If
p1ent 6= p2ent the second price auction (with r = XS) is not ex post ecient. If p1ent < p2ent, the
good is under-assigned (resp. over-assigned) to the entrants from group 1 (resp. 2) and we can
apply Theorem 4.
Corollary 5.6 If there are two groups of entrants and if the probability of bankruptcy is lower for
group 1, then it is detrimental to exclude bidders from group 1 in the second-price auction with
reserve price XS.
Consider next environments in which all entrants have a (common) probability pent ∈ [0, 1]
to go bankrupt, and the (single) incumbent has a probability pinc ∈ [0, 1] to go bankrupt. If
pinc 6= pent, then the second price auction (with r = XS) is not ex post ecient. If pinc > pent
(resp. pinc < pent), the good is over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to the incumbent (according
to the correct valuations) and we can apply Theorem 2 (resp. 3).
43Abnormally low bids are often perceived as irregular and are discarded on the ground that the risk of failure
is too high.
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Corollary 5.7 Assume that the risk of breakdown is larger (resp. smaller) for the incumbent. If
the seller's maximizes revenue (resp. internalizes the payo of the incumbent), then the optimal
set-asides policy for the seller consists in excluding the incumbent (resp. in no-exclusion) in the
second-price auction with reserve price XS.
Comments: 1) In a number of instances, the plausible assumption is that the incumbent
has a smaller risk of breakdown than entrants so that Corollary 5.7 is a call for no-exclusion
if the seller internalizes a large enough share of the incumbent's payo and a call for exclusion
only to the extent that the bankruptcy risks of the incumbent and the entrants are not too
dissimilar and that the seller does not internalize much the rents of the incumbent. 2) In our
environment with risks of breakdown, the correct Vickrey auction would assign the good to the
bidder with the highest correct valuation. More precisely, the bidder with the highest correct
valuation (1−p)·x+p·XS should win the good (provided that x ≥ XS) and pay44 his contribution
to the welfare x′ + (p−p
′)
(1−p) (x
′ − XS) where x′ and p′ correspond respectively to the valuation
and probability of bankruptcy of the bidder with the second highest correct valuation (provided
x′ ≥ XS). For such an ecient auction, we could apply Theorem 1 directly. More generally, if the
auction does not take into account appropriately the relative risk of bankruptcy beyond the point
where it over-assigns the good to the incumbent (resp. under-assigns the good to the entrants
from group 1), then Theorem 2 (resp. 4) extends. 3) Our environment with risk failure is actually
equivalent to the auction models used for advertisement slots on Internet (as used by Google and
most publishers) under a pay-per-click system (Agarwal, Athey and Yang, 2009). Given that
there is a huge heterogeneity in terms of the probability of clicks (or conversion rates), winners
are no longer ranked according to their bid per click as it used to be but rather according to their
bid times the estimated probability that they receive a click. The evolution of the mechanism can
be roughly interpreted as a move from the (inecient) Vickrey auction to the Vickrey auction
with respect to the correct valuation.
5.5 General mechanisms in Myersonian environments
So far we have considered auction formats in which bidders have a weakly dominant strategy.
The analysis extends straightforwardly to general auction formats when valuations are drawn
independently across bidders (Myersonian environments) and the equilibrium allocation is the
same as the one arising in the previously considered mechanisms. In particular, Theorem 1
extends straightforwardly to any mechanism which is payo-equivalent to the Vickrey auction
from an ex ante perspective and for any possible entry prole µ and any vector of incumbents I
so that the expected prot of the incumbent i (resp. a group k entrant) is still equal to Πinci (µ, I)
(resp. Πentk (µ, I)). On the one hand, the revenue is the same as in the Vickrey auction for any
44Indeed, the payment occurs only when the winner is not bankrupt so that the expected payment is the previous
gure multiplied by (1− p).
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entry prole. On the other hand, since the equilibrium free entry conditions are determined by
the payos of the entrants whose expressions remain unchanged, the set of equilibrium entry
proles is the same as in the Vickrey auction. From the well-known payo equivalence Theorem
(see e.g. Milgrom, 2004), in a Myersonian environment, any mechanism which assigns the good
eciently and leaves no rents to buyers with null valuation is payo-equivalent to the Vickrey
auction. An example of such a mechanism is the rst-price auction with the reserve price XS in
a Myersonian setup with symmetric buyers but also under the extra assumption that the set of
entrants is publicly observed before the bidding stage. In particular, with a single incumbent, we
still get that it would be protable to exclude him.45
More generally, in a Myersonian environment, we know that the rents of the various agents
are fully determined (up to some constants) by the assignment rule. If a given auction induces
(in equilibrium) an assignment rule that can be implemented in dominant strategy,46 and if we
can apply Theorems 2 or 4 to the payo equivalent dominant strategy auctions, then the results
apply to our given auction. For example, in environments with a single incumbent and if the
auction induces a φ(b, r)-assignment rule with b(x) ≥ x and r ≤ XS , then the optimal set aside
policy consists in excluding the incumbent and keeping the entrants.47 We apply this principle
to the study of rst-price auctions.
First-price auctions with or without the right-of-rst-refusal
A form of explicit discrimination sometimes encountered in procurement auctions is the right-
of-rst-refusal: it consists in letting a special (or preferred) bidder match the nal highest bid as it
is analyzed in Burguet and Perry (2006) in a procurement setup.48 We consider below the eect of
excluding the incumbent assumed to enjoy the right-of-rst-refusal. At rst, it might seem odd to
simultaneously assume that the incumbent can be excluded and can enjoy a right-of-rst-refusal.
45If the set of entrants is not observed, then it creates an asymmetry between the incumbent and the entrants:
an entrant expect to face one more competing bidder than the incumbent and thus bid more aggressively than the
incumbent which induces ineciencies. Formally, if Gµ(.) (resp. G
I
µ(.)) denote the CDF of the highest bid among
the entrants (resp. the bid of the incumbent), then in the Poisson model the distribution of the highest competing
bid of any entrant is b → Gµ(b) · GIµ(b), which rst-order stochastically dominates b → Gµ(b) the distribution
of the highest competing bid of the incumbent. If bidders do not receive extra information additional to their
valuation, then entrants should bid more aggressively than the incumbent in the auction and the incumbent is thus
disadvantaged which is a countervailing force against his exclusion.
46From Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992), in our simple single-good auction setup: dominant strategy imple-
mentation is feasible if and only if the probability that a bidder wins the good is non-decreasing in his valuation
for any set of valuation of his opponents. E.g. φ(b, r) assignment rules are implementable in dominant strategy.
47The class of φ(b, r)-allocation rules excludes allocation rules that depend on the realization of the set of entrants
(e.g. the number of entrants). Nevertheless, the argument would also extend if a dierent function b is used (to
characterize the assignment rule) depending on the set of entrants (e.g. the number of entrants).
48In a procurement, it corresponds to a right to match the lowest bid. This right is often observed in procurements
either through an explicit right or an implicit one (see Lee (2008) for examples of industries where it is a common
practice). Note also that corruption in procurements has also been modeled as a bribery auction where the winner
obtains a right of rst refusal (Compte et al., 2005). In procurements for public transportation contracts in London,
after reviewing the bids, the regulator can ask the incumbent for a second oer (if his oer is close to the winning
bid) for him to win the bid (Amaral et al. (2009)). In the English auctions for cricket players in the Indian
Premier League, the team that owns the auctioned player in the previous season has an equivalent right to match
the winning bid (Lamy et al. (2016)). Those two examples illustrate that the right-of-rst-refusal is typically
attributed to a bidder than can be viewed as an incumbent according to our framework.
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Our prefered interpretation is that the right-of-rst-refusal captures a form of implicit corruption
between the representative of the authority and the incumbent, and the question for the authority
(not its representative) is whether it may be benecial to not let the incumbent participate (taking
as given the reduced form eect of corruption if the incumbent can participate).
In a rst price auction with reserve price XS , assuming that entrants simultaneously choose
to enter and submit a bid,49 if the incumbent has a right-of-rst-refusal, then the equilibrium
assignment rule is distorted from the ecient assignment by assigning the good too often to the
incumbent. More precisely, if we let β : [XS ,∞) → [XS ,∞) denote the equilibrium bid function
of the entrants (where β(x) < x for x > XS as a result of bid shading), then the incumbent will
exert his right-of-rst-refusal and win the good whenever the valuation of the incumbent is in
the interval (β(x), x) where x is the highest valuation among the entrants, and this is inecient.
Thus, the equilibrium allocation is such that the good is over-assigned to the incumbent, and, in a
Myersonian environment, we obtain as corollary of Theorem 2 that the insight found in Example
1b applies more generally:
Corollary 5.8 In a Myersonian environment, if the incumbent has a right-of-rst-refusal in the
rst-price auction with reserve price XS, then the revenue-optimal set-asides policy consists in
excluding the incumbent.
Remark. The right-of-rst-refusal can also be used in second-price/English auctions as an-
alyzed in Bikhchandani, Lippman and Reade (2005). The equilibrium analysis is then straight-
forward: it is a dominant strategy for the bidders who do not have this right to bid up to their
valuation, while the bidder with this right matches the nal price if it is below his valuation.
If the reserve price is XS , the auction obviously over-assigns the good to the incumbent while
the mechanism is a dominant-strategy auctions without participation fees so that we can apply
Theorem 2 directly.
To conclude this section, we discuss informally what happens to our exclusion insights in
standard rst-price auctions (with no right of rst refusal) and still with the reserve price set at
XS , assuming that potential entrants are symmetric but that there may be asymmetries between
the incumbent and the entrants. In a (standard) rst-price auction where the number of entrants
is disclosed, whether the good is over- or under-assigned to the incumbent depends on the relative
strength of the incumbent and of the entrants' valuation distributions. From Maskin and Riley
(2000) and Lebrun (1999), we know that a bidder who has a weaker (resp. stronger) 50
valuation distribution bids more aggressively, and thus accordingly the good is over-assigned
(resp. under-assigned) to the weak (resp. strong) bidder following our terminology. As a result,
49This guarantees that all entrants from the dierent groups use the same bidding function as detailed in Jehiel
and Lamy (2015).
50Maskin and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1999) need a stronger notion of dominance than rst-order stochastic
dominance: it is reverse hazard rate dominance. The incumbent is said to be weaker (resp. stronger) than the
entrants if f
I (x)
F I (x)
≥ (resp. ≤) f(x)
F (x)
for any x ∈ (x, x].
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we obtain that it is always revenue-optimal to exclude the incumbent if he is weak while no-
exclusion is welfare-optimal if he is strong.51 At the other extreme, note that a very strong
incumbent would completely discourage entry, which would then make exclusion protable. For
other cases in which the incumbent is stronger than entrants but to a more moderate extent, our
analysis does not allow to conclude whether excluding the incumbent would be good for revenues.
Concerning the exclusion of entrants (when there are only two groups of entrants so that we
can apply Maskin and Riley (2000) and Lebrun (1999)) and assuming there are no incumbents and
the set of entrants is disclosed -not only the number of entrants but also their group identities-, we
obtain then that it is always detrimental to exclude the entrants from the stronger group. Turning
to the policy debate on set-asides in public procurements and given that SMEs are typically viewed
as having weaker valuation distributions, such an observation pleads thus against set-asides for
SMEs when large rms can be considered as entrants in our terminology (i.e., when they do not
participate for sure).
6 The Vickrey auction with multiple incumbents
In order to understand better the multiple incumbents case, we come back to the Vickrey
auction, and we consider the case of symmetric potential entrants. Given the restriction to a
single group of entrants, we alleviate notation, and simplify the equilibrium entry rate µ∗(I, E)
into µ∗(I). With multiple incumbents, if we plug (17) for i ∈ I into the expression of the revenue
(14), we get
R(µ∗(I), I) = TW (µ∗(I), I−i)−
∑
j∈I−i
Πincj (µ
∗(I), I) (21)
and the revenue eect of excluding incumbent i can be written as:
R(µ∗(I−i), I−i)−R(µ∗(I), I) =
≥0︷ ︸︸ ︷
TW (µ∗(I−i), I−i)− TW (µ∗(I), I−i)
−
∑
j∈I−i
[
Πincj (µ
∗(I−i), I−i)−Πincj (µ∗(I), I)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ or ≤0 ?
.
(22)
There are two conicting eects of excluding incumbent i. On the one hand, it increases
the rst term in (21) since TW (µ∗(I), I−i) ≤ TW (µ∗(I−i), I−i). In words, it increases the total
welfare minus the rents of incumbent i. This is the analog of the (positive) eect of exclusion
with a single incumbent that we have previously highlighted. On the other hand, there is a novel
eect at work. Excluding incumbent i can also have an impact on the rents of the remaining
incumbents. The sign of this second eect is ambiguous without additional restrictions. Ceteris
paribus (without taking into account the eect on the entry rate), the presence of incumbent i has
51Instead of applying Theorem 3, it is sucient to check that the payo of an entrant does not increase when
there are more entrants (see footnote 37) which holds in rst-price auctions (see Arozamena and Cantillon (2004)
for details on the monotonicity when competition increases).
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a negative impact on the rents of the other incumbents. However, excluding incumbent i has also
an impact on the entry rate. Intuitively, without incumbent i, the participation rate of entrants
should be larger (this is true if potential entrants are symmetric, otherwise the entrants of some
group(s) may possibly participate less), which should attenuate if not counterbalance the previous
negative impact on the seller's revenue. The rest of this Section elaborates on this intuition.
6.1 A special class of incumbents
In a simple class of incumbents' valuation distributions, we are able to show that the revenue
advantage of excluding the incumbents extends to the multi-incumbent case. Specically, consider
the following assumption on bidders' valuation distributions.
Assumption A 1 Potential entrants are symmetric with valuations distributed according to F (·|·)
and for each incumbent i ∈ I, there exists λi ≥ 0 such that F Ii (x|z) = e−λi·(1−F (x|z)) for each x, z.
An interpretation of this class of distributions is that the valuation of incumbent i can be
viewed as being the highest valuation among potential entrants entering according to the Poisson
distribution with λi entrants on average. This implies that if the incumbent i is substituted by
an average of λi extra entrants, then the distribution of the highest competing bid remains the
same from the viewpoint of any new entrant contemplating whether or not to enter. Formally,
under A1 we have
Πent(µ+ λi, I−i) = Π
ent(µ, I). (23)
This further implies that µ∗(I−i) = µ
∗(I) + λi if µ
∗(I) > 0. Combined with the analog of the
equality (23) but for the incumbents j 6= i, we obtain that Πincj (µ∗(I−i), I−i) = Πincj (µ∗(I), I) for
any j 6= i so that it is protable to exclude bidder i. Given that µ∗(I) ≤ µ∗(I) for any I ⊆ I,
if µ∗(I) > 0, our argument can be repeated for any set of incumbents, thereby allowing us to
conclude:
Proposition 6.1 Under Assumption 1, if µ∗(I) > 0, then the revenue-optimal set-asides policy
in the Vickrey auction consists in excluding all incumbents.
Remark. Note that the welfare loss from full exclusion is equal to (µ∗(I) − µ∗(∅)) · C.
However, this loss is more than compensated by the rents of the incumbents. For incumbent i,
his equilibrium rent is always larger than λi ·C (provided that the entry rate of potential entrants
is strictly positive). The interpretation here is that an incumbent can be viewed as a ring of an
average of λi buyers (and where the size of the ring follows a Poisson distribution). The ring sends
to the auction only the buyer with the highest valuation. By contrast, if the various buyers in the
ring would have behaved competitively then those buyers would be exactly in the same situation
as the potential entrants and their excepted gross payo in the auction would be C in equilibrium
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(it is thus the cooperative behavior through the ring that explains why the incumbent is making
extra rents).
6.2 Asymmetric bidders
To cover a larger range of valuation distributions for incumbents, we consider the following
set of assumptions that will be used to analyze the eect of excluding incumbent i ∈ I:
Assumption A 2 1. We are in a Myersonian environment with symmetric entrants (K = 1)
whose valuations are distributed according to F (·),
2. The function x→ 1
F Ij (x)
· 1−F
I
j (x)
1−F (x) is (strictly) decreasing on (x, x) for any j ∈ I−i,
3. The function x→ − log[F
I
i (x)]
1−F Ii (x)
· 1−F
I
i (x)
1−F (x) is (strictly) decreasing on (x, x).
Remarks. Assumption 2 holds in the special case in which the valuation distribution of the
incumbents is also F . A general simple sucient condition guaranteeing that the monotonicity
conditions hold in Assumption 2 is given in the Appendix: It is satised if the distribution of
the incumbents can be interpreted as (possibly dierent) mixtures of ring of entrants of various
sizes (i.e. such that the valuation is distributed according to F k if the ring is of size k ≥ 1).
Observe that when Assumption 1 holds, Assumption 2 is violated just at the margin insofar as
the monotonicity in the third requirement fails to be strict.52
Proposition 6.2 Under Assumption 2, in the Vickrey auction, the rents of the non-excluded
incumbents I−i increase when incumbent i is excluded.
Hence, under the conditions of Proposition 6.2, there is a non-trivial trade-o on the eect of
revenues of excluding incumbent i. On the one hand, excluding incumbent i enhances the welfare
net of incumbent i's rents as in our single incumbent case. On the other hand, it increases the
rents of the non-excluded incumbents. While in general it is not clear in which direction the
trade-o might go, we note now that when incumbent i is suciently small/weak (everything else
being equal), it is not good to exclude i.
To see this, observe that µ∗(I−i) − µ∗(I) must be small if incumbent i is suciently weak
(thereby winning very rarely the auction and thus aecting only marginally the entry decisions).
Developing (22) reveals that the rst (benecial) eect is approximately equal to
∂TW (µ∗(I−i), I−i)
∂µ
·[µ∗(I−i)−µ∗(I)]+
∂2TW (µ∗(I−i), I−i)
(∂µ)2
·
[µ∗(I−i)− µ∗(I)]2
2
=
∂2TW (µ∗(I−i), I−i)
(∂µ)2
·
[µ∗(I−i)− µ∗(I)]2
2
52More precisely it is the third requirement that is violated under Assumption 1 (assuming we are in a Myersonian
environment) given that − log[F
I
i (x)]
1−F Ii (x)
· 1−F
I
i (x)
1−F (x) = λi which does not depend on x. By contrast, one can check that the
second requirement in A2 holds since x→ e
−λ(1−F (x))−1
1−F (x) is (strictly) decreasing (by using the inequality e
1+x ≥ x).
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since µ∗(I−i) ∈ Argmaxµ∈R+ TW (µ, I−i). Hence, the rst channel is of second order due to the
welfare-maximizing entry rate when i is absent. By contrast, the second (detrimental) eect on
other incumbents' rents is of rst order,53 thereby allowing us to conclude:
Proposition 6.3 Assume incumbent i's valuation distribution takes the form F Ii (x) = [G(x)]
λ
for some λ > 0 and where G(.) is a CDF. Let Assumption 2 hold.54 If λ is small enough then the
revenue in the Vickrey auction reduces when incumbent i is excluded.
This proposition extends the insight developed in Example 1d illustrating that small/weak
incumbents should not be excluded.
7 Further insights
7.1 Beyond private values: the case of an informed incumbent
In interdependent value contexts, rational bidders tend to bid more cautiously when the
number of participants increases so as to internalize the winner's curse. Bulow and Klemperer
(2002) suggest that it can then be benecial for the seller to limit the total number of potential
bidders when bidders are symmetric or to exclude a strong bidder whose presence would reduce
the competition by exacerbating others' response to the winner's curse.55 As we now illustrate,
our exclusion principle is typically reinforced if the information held by the incumbent aects the
valuation of other participants due to an informational advantage of the incumbent. Roughly, the
intuition as to why it is still good to exclude the incumbent in this case is as follows: Entrants
tend to bid more cautiously as compared with the situation in which they would know the signal
of the incumbent so as to internalize the winner's curse. This in turn ensures that the incumbent
gets a rent that is larger than his marginal contribution to the welfare. The conclusion follows
then by using arguments similar to those developed above in the private value case.
To formalize this, consider the same model as in Section 2 but with the dierence that what
we call valuations are now private signals. For the incumbent, we still assume that his signal,
denoted by xI , coincides with his valuation. However, for a given entrant, we assume that if
he receives the signal xE then his valuation is now H(xE , xI) where H(., .) is increasing in both
arguments, strictly increasing in its rst argument with the derivative with respect to its second
argument being less than one. Then without loss of generality, we can normalize the entrants'
signals so that H(x, x) = x.56
To make the analysis simpler, we consider the ascending (button) auction with no reserve
price in which the price raises continuously, bidders may quit at any time, and the auction stops
53For this, it is crucial that the monotonicity in the third requirement is strict.
54Note that if A2 holds (with respect to incumbent i) for a given λ > 0 then it will be so for each λ > 0.
55Compte and Jehiel (2002) show that even the welfare may increase when some bidders are excluded.
56As in Milgrom and Weber (1982), we consider a model involving both private and common values components.
However we depart from their symmetry assumption and as in Engelbrecht et al. (1983) we consider that only
one bidder is informed about the common value component. Such models have be developed for oil and gas leases
auctions (Hendricks and Porter, 1988) and more recently for Internet ad slots auctions (Abraham et al., 2013).
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when there is one bidder left who has then to pay the current price. We also assume that bidders
observe the identity of the remaining active bidders, and that the seller's reservation value is null
(XS = 0). The (weakly dominant) equilibrium strategy of the incumbent consists in remaining
active up to his valuation xI . For the entrants, the decision to exit or to remain active at price
p depends on whether the incumbent is still active or not. If the incumbent has dropped from
the auction thereby revealing his valuation xI through his exit time, an entrant with signal x
remains active up to H(x, xI). If the incumbent is still active, which only reveals that xI ≥ p, an
entrant with signal x remains active up to x.57 Such strategies constitute an ex-post equilibrium,
and the good is assigned eciently. Without the incumbent, we are back to the Vickrey auction
in a private value setting. However, it is no longer the case that the payo of the incumbent
corresponds to his contribution to welfare, i.e. (17) no longer holds in the interdependent value
case. The rent (resp. the marginal contribution to the welfare) of the incumbent with valuation
xI when the largest signal among entrants is xE can be written as xI −xE (resp. xI −H(xE , xI))
if xI > xE and 0 otherwise (and obviously both the rent and the contribution to welfare coincide
when there are no entrants). Since H(xE , xI) ≥ H(xE , xE) = xE if xE ≤ xI , the expected rent of
the incumbent outweighs his expected contribution to welfare, which in turn allows us to extend
Theorem 1 to this interdependent value setting:
Proposition 7.1 In an English auction with no reserve price, when the seller's reservation value
is null and when valuations may depend on the incumbent's information as described above, the
revenue-optimal set-asides policy consists in excluding the incumbent and allowing all groups of
entrants to participate.
7.2 Set-asides versus split-awards
As advocated by Milgrom (2004), split-awards constitute alternative tools to promote entry
in situations with asymmetric competitors.58 Instead of selling the good as a single lot, the
seller can split the good into several lots (possibly of dierent sizes) typically requiring that any
given bidder can buy at most one lot. While split-awards may have good properties in terms of
reducing the rents left to the incumbent(s), we note in the following result that when there is a
single incumbent, excluding the incumbent is always preferable to using even cleverly designed
split-awards.
Formally, a split-award is characterized by α = (α1, · · · , αK) ∈ (0, 1]K with
∑K
k=1 αk = 1
specifying that the good is split into K lots of sizes α1, · · · , αK with the requirement that a given
bidder cannot be assigned more than one lot. Buyers' valuations are assumed to be linear in the
57This follows from usual marginal considerations as developed in Milgrom and Weber (1982). This is also where
the assumption ∂H(xE ,xI )
∂xI
< 1 is used.
58The split-award literature (Anton and Yao (1989) and Gong, Li and McAfee (2011)) has emphasized the
possible benets in terms of pre-participation investments rather than entry. In a very dierent context but in a
related vein, Gilbert and Klemperer (2000) show that quantity rationing can be protable for a monopolist so as
to increase low-value consumer's incentives for pre-purchasing investments.
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size of the lot. That is, a buyer with valuation x attaches a valuation αk · x to the lot k with size
αk. For any split-award α, we can dene an associated generalized Vickrey auction (Edelman,
Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007) in which buyers get their marginal contribution to the welfare given
the allotment constraints imposed by the split-award α (for example, if the split-award involves
symmetric lots, i.e. α1 = · · · = αK = 1K , then the associated generalized Vickrey auction is the
K + 1th− price auction).
Jehiel and Lamy (2015) show that the property that equilibrium entry rates must maximize the
total welfare (here Lemma 3.1) extends to split-award generalized Vickrey auctions. As argued in
Section 4.3, we obtain then that Theorem 1 remains valid in such environments, namely that the
revenue can only increase if the incumbent is excluded.59 But, once the incumbent is excluded,
Jehiel and Lamy (2015) imply that the standard Vickrey auction (which is optimal among all
possible mechanisms) outperforms any split-award auction. We conclude that
Proposition 7.2 When there is a single incumbent, the revenue in any split-award generalized
Vickrey auction with the incumbent is dominated by the Vickrey auction in which the incumbent
is excluded.
Remark. We note that one cannot apply our analysis with multiple incumbents to split-
award generalized Vickrey auctions: in particular, facing an incumbent with the distribution
F Ii (x|z) = e−λi·(1−F (x|z)) is no longer equivalent to facing an average of λi entrants with the
distribution F (x|z) (following a Poisson distribution) due to the constraint that a bidder can get
at most one lot.
7.3 Set-asides versus fees/subsidies
If the seller were free to charge any fee including incumbents, the seller's revenue would be
aligned with the total welfare assuming incumbents have no private information at the time the
fee is charged, and thus set-asides would not be optimal.60
In this section, we develop a more restrictive view on fees: we consider that the seller can
only tax or subsidize entry. In some procurements, there are some funds dedicated to reimburse
partially the physical participation costs of the bidders (in an attempt to reduce the barriers to
entry).61 For example, in the merger case considered in footnote 1, the French antitrust authority
decided to create a fund (to be nanced by the merged entity) aimed at boosting competition
by reimbursing the participation costs of those rms that were not incumbents. Below, we have
59More generally, we can apply our exclusion insight to any auction format that can be reinterpreted as a
pivot/generalized Vickrey auction of a dierent problem (assuming the seller can coordinate entry on her most
preferred equilibrium).
60With such fees, it is as if the seller internalizes the rents of the incumbents. However, such a solution, which
outperforms Jehiel and Lamy's (2015) optimal auction, does not seem realistic because it will stand in conict with
participation constraints.
61See Gal and al. (2007) for such a model that relies crucially on the fact that those participation costs are
veriable to some extent, namely that we cannot have opportunistic bidders who enter the auction only to collect
those subsidies (which in our Poisson model would raise existence of equilibrium issues).
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implicitly in mind that subsidizing entry is easier to implement than imposing an entry tax (which
may in some circumstances lead to the violation of participation constraints).
Similarly to set-asides, subsidies for entrants are an instrument that allows to get closer to the
optimal revenue characterized in Jehiel and Lamy (2015) insofar as it allows the seller to reduce
the incumbents' rents.
We note from (21) that the following expression
max
µ∈RK+
R(µ, I) = max
µ∈RK+
{
TW (µ, I−i)−
∑
j∈I−i
Πincj (µ, I)
}
(24)
is an upper bound on the revenue that can be reached with the set of incumbents I (assumed to
include incumbent i) when the seller can charge fees/subsidies to entrants (and only them) on the
top of the Vickrey auction. As it turns out, if the seller is free to charge any group-specic fee ek
to entrants from group k (ek < 0 corresponds to a subsidy), such a bound can be reached (this
amounts to adjusting the fees/subsidies so that the required µ are obtained, formally the entry
fee charged to a group k entrant should be set at ek = Π
ent
k (µ, I) for each k ∈ E).62
If incumbent i is excluded, the revenue is bounded from above by
max
µ∈RK+
R(µ, I−i) = max
µ∈RK+
{
TW (µ, I−i)−
∑
j∈I−i
Πincj (µ, I−i)
}
(25)
and this bound is reached with no fees required if there is a single incumbent (i.e. I−i = ∅). Since
Πincj (µ, I) ≤ Πincj (µ, I−i) for any j ∈ I−i, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7.3 Consider an environment in which the seller is free to post any entry fees to
the entrants in the Vickrey auction. 1) If there is a single incumbent, then fees do not outper-
form set-asides: the revenue-optimal set-asides and fee policy consists in excluding the incumbent,
keeping all kinds of entrants and having no fees. 2) Excluding some incumbents is always (weakly)
dominated by the policy that consists in imposing optimal fees and keeping the incumbent. 3)
When entrants are homogeneous, the optimal fee takes the form of a partial reimbursement.
Comments. 1) To the extent that the cost Ck can be interpreted as the outside option value of
a group k bidder, it may dier from the physical participation cost. The required subsidy in result
3 of Proposition 7.3 while smaller than Ck need not be smaller than the physical participation
cost. Hence, set-asides may in some cases strictly dominate subsidies whenever these are required
to be smaller than the physical participation costs. 2) When there is a single incumbent, we note
that there are two ways of reaching the optimal revenue: either by excluding the incumbent or
alternatively by keeping the incumbent but imposing a fee that implements the optimal entry
rate. However, the latter policy requires a detailed knowledge of how valuations are distributed
in contrast to the exclusion policy.
62We stress that this bound is lower than the optimal revenue in Jehiel and Lamy (2015) whose analysis allows
implicitly any kinds of fees for entrants but also richer forms of discrimination.
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8 Conclusion
When the designer is free to discriminate as she wishes, set-asides are not optimal as shown
by Myerson (1981) when the set of participants is exogenous or by Jehiel and Lamy (2015) when
entry is endogenous for some groups of bidders. Instead, in the optimal auction, some bidders
(the strong bidders in Myerson (1981) or the incumbents in Jehiel and Lamy (2015) must be
handicapped relative to others but not to the point that they should be excluded. It should
be mentioned that the exact derivation of the optimal auction typically requires ne knowledge
of the distributions of valuations (including that the valuations of those bidders who should be
handicapped are drawn independently of other bidders' information), which stands in contrast to
our exclusion principle result obtained in the one incumbent case that holds irrespective of any
distributional assumptions and is thus immune to the Wilson critique (see Wilson, 1987). Beyond
the robustness of our exclusion principle obtained with a single incumbent (and that extends
partially to the case of multiple incumbents), we believe that in a number of practical cases,
possible or legal discrimination cannot take the exact form required by the optimal auction, and
it is then of interest to study when simple discriminatory tools such as set-asides can be revenue-
enhancing as studied in this paper.
Our analysis has abstracted away from dynamic considerations. Two dierent lines of research
could be pursued in relation to this. First, keeping the same underlying economic setup, we could
allow the seller to employ dynamic mechanisms so as to better coordinate the entry decisions of
bidders. While such mechanisms (if feasible - they may in some cases be considered to rely on
illegal discrimination) could improve eciency (as in Bergemann and Välimäki's (2010) dynamic
pivot mechanism), it is not so clear what the eect on revenues would be as illustrated by the
dierent insights obtained by Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and Roberts and Sweeting (2013).
The welfare benets from coordination could be counterbalanced by the fact that early entrants
would now enjoy some rents giving them a status similar to that of the incumbents in our (static)
framework. Second, we could embed the present static economic environment into a dynamic one
in which bidders would make some pre-participation investments (e.g. information acquisition
as in Bergemann and Välimäki (2002) or upgrade in the type distribution as in Arozamena and
Cantillon (2004)) anticipating the future rents associated to those. The study of these extensions
is left for future research.
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Appendix
Example 1d (continued)
Assume xI and xE are deterministic variables with xE > xI + C. We also make the nor-
malization C = 1. Let Rwith−1weak−Inc denote the expected revenue of the seller if the strong
incumbent (i.e. the one which has valuation xI for sure) is excluded. Let α =
xE
xE−xI > 1 and
β = α+ ε− α · ε ∈ [1, α]. Straightforward calculations lead to
Rwithout−Inc = xE −
(
1 + ln[xE ]
)
,
Rwith−1weak−Inc = xE −
( α
(1− ε)α+ ε
+ ln[(1− ε)xE + ε(xE − xI)]
)
and
Rwith−2−Inc = xE −
(
(1− ε)α+ ε+ ln[xE − xI ]
)
.
We have then:
Rwith−2−Inc −Rwith−1weak−Inc =
α
β
− β + ln[β]
For a given α > 1, the dierence Rwith−2−Inc −Rwith−1weak−Inc is decreasing in β or equiva-
lently increasing in ε. On the whole, we obtain that starting from the two incumbents situation,
it is better to exclude (resp. to keep) the strong incumbent if ε is small (resp. large) enough.
We have then:
Rwith−2−Inc −Rwithout−Inc = 1− β + ln[α]
For a given α, the dierence Rwith−2−Inc − Rwithout−Inc is decreasing in β or equivalently
increasing in ε. On the whole, we obtain that starting from the two incumbents situation, it is
better to exclude (resp. to keep) both incumbents if ε is small (resp. large) enough.
This example allows us to cook situations whereRwith−2−Inc < Rwithout−Inc andRwith−1weak−Inc >
Rwith−2−Inc, i.e. such that starting from two incumbents it is detrimental to exclude each incum-
bents separately but would be protable to exclude them jointly. We can check that this works if
α = 20 and β = 4. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Below, we show more generally that J(I, E) = Argmaxµ∈RK+ |µk=0 if k/∈E
TW (µ, I) 6= ∅ for any
set-asides policy (I, E). As a by-product, we will also obtain the existence of our equilibrium
notion.
Since the support of valuation distributions are bounded by x, we have then W (N, I) ≤ x.
If µk >
x
Ck
, then we have TW (µ, I) < 0 ≤ TW ((0, . . . , 0), I). When maximizing the continuous
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function µ→ TW (µ, I) over {µ ∈ RK+ |µk = 0 if k /∈ E}, there is thus no loss of generality to limit
ourselves to the compact subset {µ ∈ [0, xCk ]
K |µk = 0 if k /∈ E}. As a continuous function on a
compact set reaches a maximum, we obtain then that Argmaxµ∈RK+ |µk=0 if k/∈E
TW (µ, I) 6= ∅.
Using standard calculations from auction theory, conditional on the realization z of Z, a buyer
with valuation u ≥ XS who participates in the auction against the prole N ∈ NK of entrants and
the set of incumbents I will receive the expected payo of
∫ u
XS
∏K
k=1 [Fk(x|z)]nk ·
∏
i∈I F
I
i (x|z)dx.63
The corresponding (interim) payo of a group k buyer from entering such an auction, i.e. before
knowing what his valuation will be and the realization of z, is given (after simple calculations)
by
V entk (N+k, I) =
∫ x
XS
(F (1:N∪I)(x)− F (1:N+k∪I)(x))dx. (26)
After an integration per part, the expected (interim) welfare can be expressed as
W (N, I) = XS +
∫ x
XS
(1− F (1:N∪I)(x))dx. (27)
Combining (26) and (27), we obtain
W (N+k, I)−W (N, I) = V entk (N+k, I). (28)
In words, we have the fundamental property of the Vickrey auction applied to a potential entrant:
his payo corresponds to his marginal contribution to the welfare. We note that ∂P (N |µ)∂µk =
−P (N |µ) if nk = 0 and ∂P (N |µ)∂µk = −P (N |µ) + P (N−k|µ) if nk ≥ 1. For any k ∈ E , we have
then ∂TW (µ,I)∂µk =
∑
N∈NK P (N |µ) ·
[
W (N+k, I)−W (N, I)
]
− Ck. From (15), we obtain from an
ex-ante perspective that
∂TW (µ, I)
∂µk
=
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) · V entk (N+k, I)− Ck = Πentk (µ, I). (29)
As a corollary, we obtain then that having the rst-order conditions (of local optimality)
∂TW (µ,I)
∂µk
=
(resp. ≤)
0 if µk >
(resp. =)
0 for each k ∈ E is equivalent to µ ∈ J(I, E) (for any µ such
that µk = 0 if k /∈ E). Since any global maximum must satisfy the rst-order conditions, we have
shown that Argmaxµ∈RK+ |µk=0 if k/∈E
TW (µ, I) ⊆ J(I, E).
In order to establish the reverse inclusion and thus conclude our proof, we do establish next
that the function µ → TW (µ, I) is globally concave. Deriving the equation (16) with respect to
µl and using (26), we obtain that
63This is the integral of the (interim) probability that a bidder with valuation x wins the object as x varies from
XS to u conditional on z.
45
∂2TW (µ, I)
∂µk∂µl
=
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) ·
[
V entk ([N+k]+l, I)− V entk (N+k, I)
]
=
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) ·
[ ∫ x
XS
(F (1:N+l∪I)(x)− F (1:[N+k]+l∪I)(x) + F (1:N+k∪I)(x)− F (1:N∪I)(x))dx
]
= −
∑
N∈NK
P (N |µ) · EZ
[∫ x
XS
K∏
k=1
[Fk(x|Z)]nk ·
∏
i∈I
F Ii (x|Z) · (1− Fl(x|Z))(1− Fk(x|Z))dx
]
= −EZ
[∫ x
XS
K∏
k=1
e−µk·[Fk(x|Z)] ·
∏
i∈I
F Ii (x|Z) · (1− Fl(x|Z))(1− Fk(x|Z))dx
]
≤ 0
(30)
for any k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Let HµI denote the Hessian matrix of the function µ → TW (µ, I)
at the vector of participation rates µ. In order to show that µ→ TW (µ, I) is concave on RK+ (for
any I ⊆ I), it is sucient to show that HµI is negative semi-denite for any µ in RK+ (and any
I ⊆ I).
Let Q(x, z) := [(1 − F1(x|z)), . . . , (1 − FK(x|z))]. For X ∈ RK , let X> its transpose. More
generally, the notation > is used for any matrix. We then have to show that X> ·HµI ·X ≤ 0 for
any X ∈ RK and any µ ∈ RK+ . From (30), we have:
X>HµIX = −EZ
[∫ x
XS
K∏
k=1
e−µk·[Fk(x|Z)] ·
∏
i∈I
F Ii (x|Z) ·X> ·Q(x, Z)>Q(x, Z) ·X︸ ︷︷ ︸
=[Q(x,Z)X]>·[Q(x,Z)X]≥0
dx
]
≤ 0. (31)
In other words, (31) says that HµI can be viewed as a weighted sum (including integrals)
with positive weights of the negative semi-denite matrices −[Q(x, z)]>Q(x, z) and is thus also
negative semi-denite.
Q.E.D.
Example 3 Consider one incumbent having for sure valuation xI . Consider two groups
of potential entrants. In group 1, all entrants are the high valuation xE > xI . In group 2,
valuations are distributed independently across entrants according to the following distribution:
With probability q ∈ (0, 1) (resp. 1− q), an entrant has valuation xE (xE = xI). The entry cost
denoted by C is assumed to be the same in groups 1 and 2 with C < q(xE − xI) in order to
guarantee entry is protable. If there are no set-asides, then only bidders from group 1 will enter.
The corresponding equilibrium entry rate µ1 is characterized by
e−µ1(xE − xI) = C.
On the contrary, if bidders from group 1 are excluded then the equilibrium entry rate of group
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2 is now given by µ̃2 such that
q · e−µ̃2·q(xE − xI) = C.
Let x C, xE and xI such that
C
xE−xI remains constant (strictly below e
−1 in order to guarantee
than µ1 > 1) while C and xE − xI go jointly to zero. Then the revenue without exclusion will
be approximatively (up to a term that is of the same order as C) equal to (1 − e−µ1) · xI and
(1 − e−µ̃2) · xI if group 1 is excluded. Our aim is now to show that µ̃2 > µ1 if q is picked
adequately. Let q = 1 − ε. From equilibrium conditions and then Taylor expansion, we have
e−µ1q
e−µ̃2q
= qe
−µ1q
e−µ1
= 1+ ε · (1−µ1)+◦(ε). If ε is small enough we have then µ̃2 > µ1. By appropriate
choice of the parameters, it is thus protable to exclude group 1. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1 Consider a dominant-strategy auction and take a given vector of reports
X = (x1, · · · , xn) for the competing bidders of the given incumbent.64 Let PX : R+ → [0, 1] denote
the function that gives the probability that the given incumbent gets the good as a function of
his reported valuation. From Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) and taking the perspective of
the given incumbent, the function PX(.) should be non-decreasing and the expected payo of
the given incumbent with type z is equal to
∫ z
0 PX(u)du up to a constant, and that constant is
null in an auction without participation fees. Furthermore, if the good is over-assigned (resp.
under-assigned) to the given incumbent, then the auction assigns the good with probability 1
(resp. 0) to him if it is ecient (inecient) to do so. Formally, this means that PX(z) = 1 if
z ≥ max{maxi=1,··· ,n {xi}, XS} ≡ x∗ (resp. PX(z) = 0 if z ≤ x∗). This further implies that the
expected payo of the incumbent with type z is larger (resp. smaller) than max {z − x∗, 0}, i.e.
the payo he will get in the Vickrey auction.
Since the auction assigns the good eciently among the opponents of the given incumbent,
then if the latter wins (resp. does not win) the good, his marginal contribution to the welfare is
z−x∗ (resp. 0). If the auction over-assigns the good to the given incumbent, then we get that his
expect payo is larger than his marginal contribution to the welfare. If the auction under-assigns
the good to the given incumbent, then his expected payo and his marginal contribution to the
welfare are null if he does not get the good z ≤ x∗. By contrast, if he gets the good (in which
case we have necessarily z ≥ x∗), his expected payo is smaller than z−x∗ and thus smaller than
his marginal contribution to the welfare.
The previous arguments hold ex post, namely for any realization of the prole of valuations
of the incumbent's competitors. It holds thus a fortiori from an interim perspective, namely for
any realization of the set N ∈ N+ of competitors but before knowing their valuations. Q.E.D.
Proof of eq. (20) Let TW (µ, I;φ(b, r)) and Πinc(µ, I;φ(b, r)) denote respectively the ex-
pected total welfare and the incumbent's expected payo in a dominant strategy auction without
64X is an empty list if the given bidder faces no competitors.
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participation fees that implements a φ(b, r)-assignment rule and when the entry prole is µ ∈ RK+
when the (single) incumbent is present. Let Gµ(.) (resp. gµ(.)) denote the CDF (resp. PDF) of
the highest valuation among the entrants. In a φ(b, r)-auction and if the incumbent's valuation
is distributed independently of the entrants' valuations, the probability that the incumbent wins
the auction if his valuation is x is given by Gµ(φ(x)) if x ≥ r and is null if x < r. The expected
payo of the incumbent if his type is x ≥ r is thus given by
∫ x
r
Gµ(b(u))du = (x− r) ·Gµ(XS) +
∫ x
r
(x− u) · d[Gµ(b(u))]. (32)
So his expected payo is the same as in a second-price auction with the reserve price r but
if an entrant with valuation x bids as if his valuation were b−1(x). The incumbent's expected
payo (before learning his type) is then Πinc(µ, I;φ(b, r)) =
∫∞
r [
∫ x
r Gµ(b(u))du] · d[F
I(x)] =∫∞
r Gµ(b(x)) · (1− F
I(x))dx. With the (single) incumbent, we have by denition of a φ(b, r)-
auction:
TW (µ, I;φ(b, r)) = F I(r) · TW (µ, ∅;φ(b, r)) +
∫ ∞
r
(
x ·Gµ(b(x)) +
∫ ∞
b(x)
ud[Gµ(u)]
)
d[F I(x)].
After an integration per part and plugging the expression of Πinc(µ, I;φ(b, r)), we obtain that
TW (µ, I;φ(b, r))−TW (µ, ∅;φ(b, r)) = Πinc(µ, I;φ)+
(
r·Gµ(XS)+
∫ ∞
XS
xd[Gµ(x)]−TW (µ, ∅;φ(b, r))
)
·(1−F I(r))
+
∫ ∞
r
(x− b(x)) · (1− F I(x)) · d[Gµ(b(x))].
Since TW (µ, ∅;φ(b, r)) = TW (µ, ∅) = XSGµ(XS) +
∫ x
XS
xd[Gµ(x)], we obtain (20). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5.2 Consider a dominant-strategy auction and take a given vector of re-
ports x−i = (x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn) for the opponents of the given bidder i.65 Let Px−i :
R+ → [0, 1] denote then the function that gives the probability that bidder i gets the good
as a function of his reported valuation (in particular Px−i(xi) = φi(X)). From Mookherjee
and Reichelstein (1992) and taking the perspective of the given bidder, the function Px−i(.)
should be non-decreasing and the expected payo of the given bidder with type z is equal
to
∫ z
0 Px−i(u)du up to a constant, and that constant is null in an auction without participa-
tion fees. Furthermore, if the good is over-assigned (resp. under-assigned) to bidder i, then
the auction assigns the good with probability 1 (resp. 0) to him if it is ecient (inecient)
to do so. Let zx−i = inf{z ∈ R+|φi(x1, · · · , xi−1, z, xi+1, · · · , xn) = 1} and zx−i = sup{z ∈
65X is an empty list if the given bidder faces no competitors.
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R+|φi(x1, · · · , xi−1, z, xi+1, · · · , xn) = 0}. Let wx−i denote the welfare when bidder i is absent
and wX denote the welfare with all bidders. Note that the loser neutral property implies that
wX = Px−i(xi) · xi + (1 − Px−i(xi)) · wx−i or equivalently the contribution of bidder i to the
welfare can be written as Px−i(xi) · (xi − wx−i). Moreover, if the good is over-assigned (resp.
under-assigned) to bidder i, then zx−i ≤ wx−i) (resp. zx−i ≥ wx−i)).
Consider rst the case where the good is over-assigned to bidder i. We can restrict ourselves
to the cases where the contribution of bidder i to the welfare is positive so that xi > zx−i and
Px−i(xi) = 1. The contribution to the welfare xi−wx−i is smaller than xi− zx−i which is a lower
bound on bidder i's payo.
Consider next the case where the good is under-assigned to bidder i. We can restrict ourselves
to the cases where bidder i gets the good with positive probability so that xi > zx−i . The
contribution to the welfare Px−i(xi) · (xi−wx−i) is larger than Px−i(xi) · (xi−zx−i) which is larger
than
∫ xi
zx−i
Px−i(u)du and then larger than
∫ xi
0 Px−i(u)du, i.e. bidder i's payo. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
With a single group of entrants, we use the simplied notation n ≡ N and n+ 1 ≡ N+1. Let
φ denote the assignment rule in the auction.
The assumption that the probability to win the good for an entrant with a given signal does
not increase when an extra entrant participates implies that V ent(n + 1, I;φ) ≤ V ent(n, I;φ) for
both I = {i} (where i refers to the single incumbent) and I = ∅ and for any n ≥ 1. This further
implies that Πent(µ, I;φ) is nonincreasing in µ. Note also that given that the auction involves
no entry fees, then µ · Πent(µ, I;φ) ≤ x − µ · C. On the whole the set of equilibrium candidates
with (resp. without) the incumbent, i.e. if I = {i} (resp. I = ∅), is an interval denoted by
[µ∗
in
, µ∗in] ⊂ R+ (resp. [µ∗out, µ
∗
out] ⊂ R+). Note, e.g., that µ∗in = µ
∗
in = 0 if Π
ent(0, {i};φ) < 0.
We apply Lemma 5.1 for the entrants: If auction φ over-assigns the good to the entrants, then
W (n+ 1, I;φ)−W (n, I;φ) ≤ V ent(n+ 1, I;φ) for each n ≥ 0 and thus
∂TW
∂µ
(µ, I;φ) ≤ Πent(µ, I;φ) (33)
for both I = {i} and I = ∅. Note that ∂TW (µ,∅;φ)∂µ |µ=0 = W (1, ∅;φ) − C. Note that the
assumption that the assignment rule φ over-assigns to the entrants implies that the dierence
W (1, ∅) −W (1, ∅;φ) is bounded by the probability the entrant has a valuation below XS times
XS which thus implies that W (1, ∅;φ) ≥W (1, ∅)−XS . From the assumption W (1, ∅) > XS +C
and using (33), we get that Πent(0, ∅;φ) > 0 which implies that µ∗
out
> 0.
The assumption that the probability to win the good for an entrant with a given signal de-
creases after adding the incumbent implies that Πent(µ, {i};φ) < Πent(µ, ∅;φ) which then implies
that µ∗
out
> µ∗in.
Let µ∗in ∈ [µ∗in, µ
∗
in] (resp. µ
∗
out ∈ [µ∗out, µ
∗
out]) denote the equilibrium entry rate with (resp.
without) the incumbent. We have thus µ∗out > µ
∗
in ≥ µ∗in.
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Given that µ → Πent(µ, {i};φ) is nonincreasing, (33) implies that ∂TW (µ,{i};φ)∂µ < 0 for any
µ > µ∗in. Since µ
∗
out > µ
∗
in ≥ µ∗in, we have thus TW (µ∗in, {i};φ) > TW (µ∗out, {i};φ).
We apply Lemma 5.1 again but now for the incumbent: If auction φ under-assigns the good
to the (single) incumbent i, then W (n, {i};φ)−W (n, ∅;φ) ≥ V inci (n, {i};φ) for each n ≥ 0 which
further implies that
TW (µ, {i};φ)− TW (µ, ∅;φ) ≥ Πinci (µ, {i};φ). (34)
By reporting a null valuation, the incumbent can guarantee himself a null payo. Conse-
quently, in a dominant strategy auction we must have Πinci (µ, {i};φ) ≥ 0 for any µ ≥ 0 which
thus implies that TW (µ∗out, {i};φ) ≥ TW (µ∗out, {i};φ).
Finally we get that TW (µ∗in, {i};φ) > TW (µ∗out, {i};φ) which concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let µ∗1, µ
∗
2 denote the equilibrium participation prole without set-asides. If µ
∗
1 = 0, then
excluding bidders from group 1 does not have any impact. Suppose then that µ∗1 > 0. Let φ
denote the assignment rule in the auction.
For i = 1, 2, let µ̂i(.) : R+ → R+ denote the function that maps the equilibrium participation
rate of entrants from group i as a function of the participation rate from the other group. Formally,
for any µ ≥ 0, µ̂1(µ) is characterized by Πent1 (µ̂1(µ), µ;φ) = 0 (resp. ≤ 0) if µ̂1(µ) > 0 (resp.
= 0). Similarly, the function µ̂2 is characterized by Π
ent
2 (µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) = 0 (resp. ≤ 0) if µ̂2(µ) > 0
(resp. = 0).
If φ is loser neutral, then for any vector X := (x1, · · · , xn) and any pair of bidders i and
j in {1, · · · , n}, we have φj(X) ≤ φj(X−i). Consequently, the winning probability of bidder
j conditional on any given signal xj can not decrease if bidder i is excluded. Consequently,
when a bidder faces more competitors, then it necessarily reduces its expected payo. In our
two group environment, V enti (N ;φ) is nondecreasing in both n1 and n2 for i = 1, 2. Further-
more, V enti (N+i;φ) < V
ent
i (N ;φ) once V
ent
i (N ;φ) > 0, for i = 1, 2.
66 We obtain then that
Πentk (µ1, µ2;φ) is nondecreasing in both µ1 and µ2 and furthermore than
∂Πentk (µ1,µ2;φ)
∂µk
< 0 if
Πentk (µ1, µ2;φ) > −Ck.
It is then straightforward that µ → µ̂1(µ) and µ →µ̂2(µ) are both non-increasing and con-
tinuous. If µ̂2(0) = 0, then group 2 is always inactive and it is thus straightforward that it is
detrimental to exclude bidders from group 1. We assume next that µ̂2(0) > 0.
If the prole (0, µ̂2(0)) satises the equilibrium condition without set-asides, then it corre-
sponds to the equilibrium prole if bidders from group 1 are excluded and our equilibrium se-
lection assumption thus guarantees that it is detrimental to exclude group 1. Suppose then that
(0, µ̂2(0)) is not an equilibrium prole (without set-asides). This implies that µ̂1(µ̂2(0)) > 0.
66If a bidder from group i has a strictly positive probability to win the good so does his extra competitor from
group i so that his probability to win the good (strictly) decreases with extra competitors from group i.
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Consider the function µ → µ̂1(µ̂2(µ)). The group 1 equilibrium prole candidates (without
set-asides) corresponds to a xed point of this function, or equivalently (given that (0, µ̂2(0)) is
not an equilibrium prole) the set of µ such that Πent1 (µ̂1(µ̂2(µ)), µ̂2(µ);φ) = 0. Consider the
smallest solution (as a xed point) which we denote by µ
1
> 0. Since the function µ→ µ̂1(µ̂2(µ))
is continuous, we have then µ̂1(µ̂2(µ)) ≥ µ for any µ ∈ [0, µ1] and thus Π
ent
1 (µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) ≥ 0 for
any µ ≤ µ̂1(µ̂2(µ)).
Let T̃W (µ;φ) := TW ((µ, µ∗2(µ));φ) denote the net expected welfare as a function of the entry
rate from group 1 given that group 2 entry rate is the equilibrium one in the auction φ. We show
next that T̃W (µ
1
;φ) ≥ T̃W (0;φ). By our equilibrium selection assumption and given that the
seller's expected revenue coincides with the total welfare, if this inequality is true then it holds
for the equilibrium prole which will allow us to conclude.
To show this inequality, write:
dT̃W (µ;φ)
dµ
=
∂TW
∂µ1
(µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) +
dµ̂2(µ)
dµ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
·∂TW
∂µ2
(µ, µ̂2(µ);φ).
Then we apply Lemma 5.2: If auction φ under-assigns the good to bidders from group 1, then
W (N+1;φ)−W (N ;φ) ≥ V ent1 (N+1;φ) (35)
and thus ∂TW∂µ1 (µ1, µ2;φ) ≥ Π
ent
1 (µ1, µ2;φ). Hence, we obtain that
∂TW
∂µ1
(µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) ≥ Πent1 (µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) ≥
Πent1 (µ̂1(µ̂2(µ)), µ̂2(µ);φ) = 0 for any µ ∈ [0, µ1].
If auction φ over-assigns the good to bidders from group 2, then
W (N+2;φ)−W (N ;φ) ≤ V ent2 (N+2;φ) (36)
and thus ∂TW∂µ2 (µ1, µ2;φ) ≤ Π
ent
2 (µ1, µ2;φ). Hence, we obtain that
∂TW
∂µ2
(µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) ≤ Πent2 (µ, µ̂2(µ);φ) =
0.
Gathering the previous inequalities, we obtain that dT̃W (µ;φ)dµ ≥ 0 for any µ ∈ [0, µ1], and thus
T̃W (µ
1
;φ) ≥ T̃W (0;φ), as needed to complete the proof. Q.E.D.
Technical computations for Section 6.2
Proof of Propositions 6.2 and 6.3
We proceed by dierentiating the revenue when the strength of incumbent i increases. Let
Gλ(.) = [Fj(.)]
λ. The limit case λ = 0 corresponds to the case where incumbent i has been
excluded while λ = 1 corresponds to the case where he is not excluded. Note that we have
dGλ(x)
dλ = log[Fj(x)] ·Gλ(.) ≤ 0.
Next we put the argument λ in the payo and revenue functions in order to indicate that the
strength of the incumbent i is parameterized by λ. With respect to our previous notation, we
will have in particular Πent(µ, I;λ) = Πent(µ, I) (resp. = Πent(µ, I−i)) if λ = 1 (resp. λ = 0) and
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similarly for any j ∈ I−i, Πincj (µ, I;λ) = Πincj (µ, I) (resp. = Πincj (µ, I−i)) if λ = 1 (resp. λ = 0).
The equilibrium entry rate µ(λ) as a function of the strength λ of the special incumbent i is
characterized (provided that this is some entry) by the equation:
Πent(µ(λ), I;λ) =
∞∑
n=0
e−µ(λ)
[µ(λ)]n
n!
·
∫ ∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)[F (x)]
n · (1− F (x))dx = C
or equivalently
∫ ∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))dx = C.
We have then
dµ(λ)
dλ
=
∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i F
I
j (x)
dGλ(x)
dλ e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))dx∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i F
I
j (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))2dx
.
Similarly, the rent of an incumbent j∗ ∈ I−i as a function of λ is given by
Πincj∗ (µ(λ), I;λ) =
∫ ∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i\{j∗}
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F Ij∗(x))dx = C.
After dierentiating the rent of such an incumbent rents with respect to λ, we get:
dΠincj∗ (µ(λ), I;λ)
dλ
=
∂Πincj∗ (µ(λ), I;λ)
∂λ
+
dµ(λ)
dλ
·
∂Πincj∗ (µ(λ), I;λ)
∂µ
=
∫ ∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F
I
j (x)
dGλ(x)
dλ
e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))dx·
[ ∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i\{j∗}
F Ij (x)
dGλ(x)
dλ
e−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F Ij∗ (x))dx∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)
dGλ(x)
dλ
e−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))dx
−
∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i\{j∗}
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F Ij∗ (x)) · (1− F (x))dx∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))2dx
]
.
Let Uj(x) :=
1
F Ij (x)
· 1−F
I
j (x)
1−F (x) , which has been assumed to be decreasing on (x, x) for any
j ∈ I−i.
Let h1 denote the density function dened by h1(x) :=
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)|
dGλ(x)
dλ |e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)]·(1−F (x))∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (y)|
dGλ(y)
dλ |e−µ(λ)[1−F (y)]·(1−F (y))dy
for x ≥ XS and 0 otherwise.
Let h2 denote the density function dened by h2(x) :=
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)Gλ(x)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (x)]·(1−F (x))2∫∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (y)Gλ(y)e
−µ(λ)[1−F (y)]·(1−F (y))2dy
for x ≥ XS and 0 otherwise.
Note that the support of the densities h1 and h2 is [max {XS , x}, x].
We have then
dΠincj∗ (µ(λ), I;λ)
dλ
= −
∫ ∞
XS
∏
j∈I−i
F Ij (x)|
dGλ(x)
dλ
|e−µ(λ)[1−F (x)] · (1− F (x))dx ·
[
Ex∼h1 [Uj∗ (x)]− Ex∼h2 [Uj∗ (x)]
]
.
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Note also that the assumption that x → − log[F
I
j (x)]
1−F (x) is decreasing on [x, x] implies that the
likelihood ratio h1h2 is decreasing on the interior of its support. Likelihood ratio dominance implies
rst-order stochastic dominance (see Appendix B in Krishna (2003)). Since Ui is decreasing on
(x, x), we obtain nally that Ex∼h1 [Uj∗(x)] > Ex∼h2 [Uj∗(x)] and thus that
dΠinc
j∗ (µ(λ),I;λ)
dλ < 0
which further implies by integration that Πincj∗ (µ(1), I; 1) < Π
inc
j∗ (µ(0), I; 0) for any j
∗ ∈ I−j . This
concludes the proof of Proposition 6.2.
By Taylor expansion of the expression (22) with respect to the parameter λ, the impact on
the revenue to exclude the incumbent i is of the form:
dR(µ(λ), I)
dλ
|λ=0 =
∂TW (µ(λ), I−i)
∂µ
|λ=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
· dµ(λ)
dλ
|λ=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
well dened
+
∑
j∈I−i
dΠincj (µ(λ), I;λ)
dλ
The latter terms in the sum are all strictly negative. The revenue is thus locally decreasing in λ
around the origin (namely when λ is close to zero) and we obtain thus Proposition 6.3.
A sucient condition for Assumption 2
Next lemma provides a sucient simple condition on the CDFs of the incumbents that will
guarantee that Assumption 2 holds. A special case of it is when incumbents and entrants are all
symmetric, i.e. when F Ii = F for any incumbent i.
Lemma A1 Let G(x) :=
∑∞
j=1 sj · [F (x)]j where sj ∈ [0, 1] for any j and
∑∞
j=1 sj = 1.
Assume that the support of F is [x, x]. Then the functions x → 1−G(x)G(x)(1−F (x)) and x →
− log[G(x)]
(1−F (x))
are both decreasing on (x, x).
Proof
On (x, x), we have
(1−G(x))
G(x)(1− F (x))
=
1
G(x)
·
∞∑
j=1
sj ·
1− [F (x)]j
1− F (x)
=
∑∞
j=1 sj ·
∑j−1
k=0 [F (x)]
k∑∞
j=1 sj · [F (x)]j
. (37)
Taking the derivative of the right-hand side of (37), we obtain that the derivative of (1−G(x))G(x)(1−F (x))
has the same sign as (
∑∞
j=2 sj ·
∑j−1
k=1 k[F (x)]
k−1) ·(
∑∞
j=1 sj · [F (x)]j)−(
∑∞
j=1 sj ·
∑j−1
k=0 [F (x)]
k) ·
(
∑∞
j=1 sj · j[F (x)]j−1).
In order to obtain that (1−G(x))G(x)(1−F (x)) is strictly decreasing on (x, x), it is thus sucient to check
that
∑∞
j=1 sj · j[F (x)]j−1∑∞
j=1 sj · [F (x)]j
>
∑∞
j=2 sj ·
∑j−1
k=1 k[F (x)]
k−1∑∞
j=1 sj ·
∑j−1
k=0 [F (x)]
k
if F (x) > 0. This comes from the fact that j·[F (x)]
j−1
[F (x)]j
>
∑j−1
k=1 k[F (x)]
k−1∑j−1
k=0 [F (x)]
k
for any j ≥ 2, which
is equivalent to the inequalities
∑j−1
k=0 j · [F (x)]
k−1 >
∑j−1
k=1 k · [F (x)]
k−1 for any j ≥ 2, which
obviously hold.
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We consider now the function x→ − log[G(x)](1−F (x)) . On (x, x), its derivative is given by
∂[− log[G(x)](1−F (x)) ]
∂x
=
f(x)
(1− F (x))2
·
[
−
∑∞
j=1 sj · (1− F (x))j · [F (x)]j−1
G(x)
− log[G(x)]
]
From the inequality log(x) > −1−xx for any x ∈ (0, 1), we have
G(x) · log[G(x)] > −(1−G(x)) =
∞∑
j=1
sj · (1− F (x))
j−1∑
k=0
[F (x)]k ≥
∞∑
j=1
sj · (1− F (x))j · [F (x)]j−1
On the whole, we obtain that
∂[
− log[G(x)]
(1−F (x)) ]
∂x < 0 on (x, x).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7.3
What remains to be shown is the result 3. When entrants are symmetric (so that µ re-
duces to a scalar), the equilibrium entry prole without subsidies, denoted by µ∗no−fee, satises
µ∗no−fee ∈ maxµ≥0{TW (µ, I)}. Let us assume that µ∗no−fee > 0 (which implies in particular
that entrants have the highest valuations with positive probability). Since µ → TW (µ, I) is
(strictly) concave and the functions µ → Πincj (µ, I), for j ∈ I, are nonincreasing, we obtain that
the equilibrium entry prole with the optimal subsidy, denoted by µ∗with−fee and which is char-
acterized by µ∗with−fee ∈ maxµ≥0{TW (µ, I) −
∑
j∈I Π
inc
j (µ, I)}, satises µ∗with−fee ≥ µ∗no−fee.
Since µ → Πent(µ, I) is nonincreasing with limµ→∞Πent(µ, I) = −C, we have thus −C <
Πent(µ∗with−fee, I) ≤ Πent(µ∗no−fee, I) = 0 which means that the optimal fee takes the form of
a partial reimbursement of the entry cost C. Q.E.D.
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